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Sinic Trade Agreements
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 2000s, the European Union and the United States
have pushed aggressively for the development of bilateral and regional
trade agreements.' Termed economic partnership agreements
("EPAs") by the European Union and free trade agreements ("FTAs")
by the United States, these instruments seek to transplant laws from
the more powerful signatories to the less powerful ones.2 In the
intellectual property area, these agreements have been fairly
controversial.' By introducing laws that go beyond the multilateral
standards required by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights' ("TRIPS Agreement"), these agreements
have ignored the local needs, national interests, technological
capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health conditions of
many less-developed members of the World Trade Organization
("WTO").
Although the use of bilateral and regional trade agreements is not
limited to the European Union and the United States,' the scholarly
' See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) [hereinafter Currents and
Crosscurrents].
2 The U.S. Trade Act of 2002 provides:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-
related intellectual property are ... to further promote adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through ...
ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement
governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United
States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States
law....
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(11) (2006).
See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free
trade agreements in intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee
Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL.J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 259 (criticizing U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Jean-Frederic Morin,
Multilateralising TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009) (examining U.S. FTA strategy).
' Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex LC,
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
' Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 828 (2007).
6 Japan, for example, has also been active in developing bilateral and regional
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literature thus far has focused mostly on these agreements. To fill the
void, this Article closely examines the bilateral and regional trade
agreements established by China and the strategies used to deploy
those agreements. To avoid confusion with the FTAs the United States
has initiated and the loaded nature of this specific term, the Article
eschews the term "China free trade agreements," even though the term
"free trade agreement" is officially used in the title. Instead, the Article
introduces the term "Sinic Trade Agreements"' ("STAs") to cover
China-initiated bilateral or regional agreements.
This Article focuses on the bilateral or plurilateral agreements China
has developed with its trading partners at both the bilateral and
regional levels. To provide background, Part I examines China's
growing engagement with the less-developed world. Part II examines
the goals, strengths, and weaknesses of FTAs and EPAs as well as the
underlying goals of STAs. Part III explores the negotiation strategies
behind these agreements, noting the differences between the Chinese
approach on the one hand and the EU and U.S. approaches on the
other. Part IV concludes by highlighting three future battles that the
accelerated development of STAs may precipitate.
I. CHINA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD
In the past two decades, "China has [played] a leading role in
speeding up investments in the Southeast Asia region through the
[Greater Mekong Subregional Economic Strategy] and ASEAN+3
[ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), China, Japan, and
Korea] frameworks."8 Although the China-Japan-South Korea free
trade agreements. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita, Japanese Policies Toward East Asian
Free Trade Agreements: Policy and Legal Perspectives, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL
TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 41 (Ross
Buckley et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE]
(discussing FTAs initiated by Japan); Bryan Mercurio, Japan-Mexico Economic
Partnership Agreement, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES
111 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009) (same).
I This term is intentionally chosen to facilitate comparison with FTAs. To a great
extent, STAs can be described as FTAs "with Chinese characteristics." However, I
avoid the term for two reasons. First, like "China free trade agreements," such a term
would retain the loaded nature of the term FTAs. Second, in the past two decades,
people have stretched the descriptor "with Chinese characteristics" considerably to
cover unique arrangements in China. The term has been used so often and so broadly
that it now no longer has any clear or identifiable meaning. Virtually anything from
China can be described as having Chinese characteristics these days!
" Shalmali Guttal, Client and Competitor: China and International Financial
Institutions, in CHINA'S NEw ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SouTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEw
PERSPECTIVE 17, 22 (Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) [hereinafter
956 [Vol. 44:953
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trade agreement has yet to be established, China remains interested in
such a project.9 In 2000, China surprised ASEAN members by
announcing its interest in developing a free trade area with them
within ten years."o To date, China has established with ASEAN a
framework agreement as well as agreements on trade in goods,
services, and investment." Together, they established the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Area, which will serve important economic,
geopolitical, and strategic goals.12
Most recently, China established bilateral trade agreements with
Chile," Pakistan," New Zealand," Singapore,'" Peru," and Costa
CHINA'S NEW ROLE I.
9 Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China's Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT:
CHINA AND ASIA'S NEw DYNAMICS 48, 54-55 (David Shambaugh ed., 2006) [hereinafter
POWER SHIFT].
'0 See DAVID C. KANG, CHINA RISING: PEACE, POWER, AND ORDER IN EAST ASIA 130
(2007).
" See Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation Between China and ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Aug. 15, 2009,
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/inforimages/200908/20090817113007764.pdf
[hereinafter ASEAN-China Agreement on Investment]; Agreement on Trade in
Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation
Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of
China, ASEAN-China, Jan. 14, 2007, available at http://www.asean.org/19346.htm
[hereinafter ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade in Services]; Agreement on Trade in
Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation
Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of
China, ASEAN-China, Nov. 29, 2004, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm
[hereinafter ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade in Goods]; Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of
China, ASEAN-China, Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm
[hereinafter ASEAN-China Framework Agreement].
12 See STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: How CHINA'S AUTHORTARIAN
MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 28 (2010) ("Not only did [the
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area] help China to secure vital sea lanes and access to raw
materials, but it also created a major regional entity that excludes the United States
and its major allies.").
13 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of Chile, Chile-China, Nov. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CHLCHN/CHLCHN_e/chilechinind-e.asp#PDF
[hereinafter CCFTA].
14 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Pak.-China, Nov. 24, 2006, available
at http/www.commerce.gov.pk/PK-CN(FTA)/Pak-Chima-FTA-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter
PCFTA].
" Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the
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Rica.18 Additional agreements with Australia, the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa ("COMESA"), the Gulf Cooperation
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates), Iceland, South Africa, and South Africa Customs
Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) are
under discussion.' 9
In addition, China is exploring greater economic cooperation with
India, with the hope of eventually developing a regional trade
agreement ("RTA"). 20 Between the two countries, "[tirade volume
increased from a paltry $260 million per year in 1990 to $18.6 billion
in 2005." " In July 2001, China also established the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, bringing the country closer to its
Central Asian neighbors."
Over the years, China has strengthened its diplomatic and economic
ties with Africa through the China-Africa Cooperation Forum and the
China-Africa Summit." As one commentator observed in 2008:
To date, China has signed trade agreements with 41 African
countries, and has set up bilateral economic and trade
mechanisms with 37 more. China has also signed bilateral
accords for the promotion and protection of investment with
29 African countries as well as bilateral double-tax avoidance
16 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, China-Sing., Oct. 23, 2008,
available at http://www.fta.gov.sg/ftas-csfta-legal.asp.
17 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, China-Peru, Apr. 28, 2009,
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu-xdwben.pdf.
"8 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, Costa Rica-China, Apr. 8,
2010, available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2010-04-08/81925.shtml.
" See Joshua Eisenman, China's Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa: Examining Beijing's
Methods and Objectives, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING'S STRATEGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 29, 42 (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter CHINA AND
THE DEVELOPING WORLD]; Heny S. Gao, China's Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer's
Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. INTL L. 41, 67-68 (2007); Chen Shu-ChingJean, China's New Brand
of Free Trade, FORBES.cOM (Apr. 9, 2008), http/www.forbes.com/2008/04/09/china-nz-fta-
markets-econ-cxjc 0409markets36.html.
20 Jim Yardley, Indian Leader in China Urges Closer Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008,
at A8.
21 Rollie Lal, China's Relations with South Asia, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD, supra note 19, at 133, 140.
22 ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINA'S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS 255 (2005).
23 Eisenman, supra note 19, at 35.
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agreements and tax evasion prevention agreements with nine
countries.24
In 2007, "just over 30 percent of China's total imports [were] derived
from African sources, and that will only increase with the recent
purchase of oil stakes in West Africa." 25
Within Greater China, the mainland has established Closer
Economic Partnership Arrangements ("CEPAs") with Hong Kong26
and then Macao.2 ' Although Hong Kong and Macao are special
administrative regions within China, they are separate customs
territories within the WTO and have been members of the
organization since its inception.28 The CEPAs are particularly
beneficial to the two regions. The arrangement with Hong Kong, for
example, has provided this special administrative region preferred
access to the mainland for selected services and reduced tariffs on a
wide variety of goods.29
In the past decade, there has also been growing economic
cooperation between Taiwan and the Yangzi River Delta. A significant
number of China-based factories now involve investment from
Taiwan, 30 as well as from Hong Kong and the Chinese diaspora."
" Xu Weizhong, Sino-African Relations: New Transformations and Challenges, in
CHINA'S NEW ROLE, supra note 8, at 69.
25 Chris Alden, China's New Engagement with Africa, in CHINA'S EXPANSION INTO
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES
213, 216 (Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA'S EXPANSION
INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE].
26 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, June 29,
2003, H.K.-China, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/main-e.pdf.
27 Mainland and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, China-Mac.,
Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://www.economia.gov.mo/public/docs/CEPACEPAI/
index/enlefulltext.pdf.
2 See World Trade Org. [WTO], Understanding the WTO: The Organization:
Members and Observers, WTO.ORG (July 23, 2008) http://www.wto.org/english/
theWTOe/whatis.e/tif e/org6_e.htm (listing Hong Kong and Macao as founding
members of WTO).
2 See David M. Lampton, China's Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America's Expense, in
POWER SHIFT, supra note 9, at 306, 313 (noting that CEPA provided Hong Kong with
"preferred access to the mainland for eighteen different services, as well as reduceld]
tariffs on 273 categories of goods").
30 As David Kang points out:
[Bly 2005 over forty thousand Taiwanese companies had made investments
in the mainland, employing 10 million people. The Taiwanese central bank
estimates that total Taiwanese investment in China is perhaps $80 billion,
with private estimates putting that figure at over $100 billion. Sixty-seven
percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment went to China in 2004, and
2011] 959
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Since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou, the cooperation between
the two regions has greatly accelerated. In fact, as Richard Bush
observes: "Like it or not, Taiwan has been pulled into the PRC's
economic orbit, and its companies have long since accepted the
centrality of the mainland for their future."3 2 Most recently, China and
Taiwan concluded the new Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement, which further promotes economic
cooperation and integration between Taiwan and the mainland.
In sum, China's active and energetic engagement with the less-
developed world has been one of the most fascinating international
developments in recent years. As Eric Heginbotham summarizes:
Chinese diplomacy appears to be taking the developing world
by storm. Its leaders seem to be everywhere: signing
investment agreements, building roads, forming "strategic
partnerships," and gaining membership in new or expanded
regional organizations. It has burnished its image by
dispatching blue-helmeted Chinese soldiers and policemen on
United Nations ... peacekeeping missions, donating money
and equipment for disaster relief efforts, settling most of its
border disputes, and engaging actively in a host of multilateral
organizations around the world. It has also overhauled its
foreign policymaking machinery, enabling political,
almost 30 percent of total trade, despite rising political tensions. Thirty-eight
percent of Taiwanese exports - over $70 billion - went to China in 2005.
Thus the economic future and vitality of Taiwan is increasingly tied to the
mainland. Over one million Taiwanese have moved to the mainland since
1985.
KANG, supra note 10, at 96-97; see also HALPER, supra note 12, at 18 ("China has
become Taiwan's largest trading partner while Taiwan has become one of China's
biggest investors. Taiwan's trade with mainland China totaled $102.3 billion in 2007,
rising 16.1 percent from the previous year. Its exports to China in 2007 totaled to
$74.28 billion, an increase of 17.3 percent, reaching a new high in the last three
years."); Richard Bush, Taiwan Faces China: Attraction and Repulsion, in POWER SHIFT,
supra note 9, at 170, 174 ("Like it or not, Taiwan has been pulled into the PRC's
economic orbit, and its companies have long since accepted the centrality of the
mainland for their future.").
See generally HUANG YASHENG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
DURING THE REFORM ERA (2005) (discussing economic interactions within Greater
China); WILLEM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC.: THE DYNAMICS OF A
NEW EMPIRE (1998) (same).
n Bush, supra note 30, at 174.
* Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, China-Taiwan,




bureaucratic, business, and academic experts to function as
part of a more seamless whole."
11. A DIFFERENT KIND OF FTA?
To engage the outside world, China has directed its energies and
resources at many different levels - bilateral, plurilateral, regional,
and multilateral. While China, like the European Union and the
United States, has deployed bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade
agreements, its STAs belong to a different kind. Unlike the EPAs and
the FTAs the European Union and the United States established, STAs
do not seek to transplant laws from the home country to its less
powerful trading partners. Part IL.A provides an overview of the
bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements that the United
States, the European Union, Japan, and other developed countries
have signed. Part II.B focuses on the STAs' unique design.
A. FTAs and EPAs
The recent proliferation of FTAs began when developed countries
became frustrated with the slowdown of trade liberalization efforts
within the international trading system." While the establishment of
the WTO and its mandatory dispute settlement process 6 in the early
1990s have undoubtedly liberalized trade, the collapse of the
Millennium Round of Trade Negotiations in Seattle37 and the
Eric Heginbotham, Evaluating China's Strategy Toward the Developing World, in
CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 19, at 189, 189.
" See generally Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 392-400
(discussing developed countries' frustrations with international trading system,
especially in intellectual property context).
36 See Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at
the WTO, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1133, 1134 (2009) ("Diplomats and trade negotiators
have referred to the DSU as the 'crown jewel' of the WTO system."); WilliamJ. Davey,
The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 32
(2005) ("Dispute settlement is one of the great successes of the WTO."); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round:
Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 275 (1997)
(noting that two achievements of Uruguay Round are, as title suggests, "Putting TRIPS
and Dispute Settlement Together"); Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use
Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 149-50 (2000) (footnote omitted) ("One of
the most celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system is the dispute resolution
mechanism which adds legitimacy to the overall design of the new trading system.").
1 See generally Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising
Failure and the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2000)
(discussing failed Seattle Ministerial); David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the
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premature end of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun
("Cancun Ministerial")3 1 created a need for alternative strategies to
liberalize trade.
One of those strategies is what Fred Bergsten has described as
"competitive liberalization,"39 which calls for the development of
preferential arrangements to liberalize trade by promoting competition
among countries in smaller regional markets.' To facilitate this form
of liberalization, the United States pushed for the establishment of
FTAs, with a strong focus on trade, investment, and related areas.
Similarly, the European Union and Japan pushed for the establishment
of EPAs, which are broader and include nontrade issues, such as
competition policy, investment, improvement of business
environment, cooperation in vocational education and training, labor
and product standards, environmental protection, tourism, illegal
migration, and the resolution of other non-economic cross-border
problems."
"Millennium Round" in Seattle: Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 349 (2000) (same); Renato Ruggiero, Reflections After Seattle, 24
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 9 (2000) (same); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade,
Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001) (same); Susan
Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 257 (2000) (same).
3 See generally Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L.
219 (2004) (discussing debacle in Cancun Ministerial).
39 Fred C. Bergsten, Competitive Liberalization and Global Free Trade: A Vision for
the Early 21st Century 1 (Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 96-15, 1996),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchlD=171; see also
Albert Fishlow, Brazil: FTA or FTAA or WTO?, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 277, 277 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) [hereinafter FTA
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES] (mentioning United States's "strategy of 'competitive
liberalization' "); J. Clark Leith & John Whalley, Competitive Liberalization and a US-
SACU FTA, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra, at 331, 331 (embracing concept
of "competitive liberalization," which author defined as "the idea that a sequence of
barrier-reducing preferential initiatives undertaken by the United States and the
European Union in competition one with [sic] another for smaller regional markets
can serve to spur global trade growth and also sow the seeds for a successful
conclusion to the World Trade Organization Doha Round in 2007 . . . ."); Renato
Ruggiero, Comment, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra, at 26, 28 [hereinafter
Comment] (noting move toward competitive regionalism).
I See Ruggiero, Comment, supra note 39, at 26 ("[N]ot only are US bilateral and
regional agreements valuable contributions to freeing trade in themselves, they also
put pressure on other countries to push forward with freeing trade multilaterally at
the WTO.").
" See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jp.), Agreement Between Japan and the
United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership (Overview),
962 [Vol. 44:953
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Depending on the number of parties and their regional affiliations,
FTAs or EPAs may be set up as bilateral, plurilateral, or regional
agreements." Although there are some distinctions between FTAs and
EPAs, their goals are rather similar for the purposes of this Article.
This section begins by discussing the goals and strengths of bilateral
and plurilateral agreements established by developed countries -
FTAs and EPAs. The section then explores the weaknesses of these
agreements, in particular their adverse impact on less-developed
countries and the multilateral trading system as a whole.
1. Goals and Strengths
Developed countries have several goals in mind when they establish
FTAs or EPAs. These goals may vary, depending on the bargaining
strength of the negotiating partners. For example, an EPA between
France and Great Britain (before both became members of the
European Union) is likely to be different from the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement4 3 which the United States
established in 2004 with states in Central America and the Dominican
Republic.
When the negotiating partners have equal bargaining strength, the
goal of these agreements is to harmonize laws, policies, and standards
of, or foster common policy positions among, the participating
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JP. (Sept. 2004), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/
agreement/overview.html (noting that, in addition to liberalizing trade and
investments and promoting freer flow of persons for business purposes between Japan
and Mexico, the Agreement "aims to promote a comprehensive economic partnership,
which includes competition policy, improvement of business environment and
bilateral cooperation in such fields as vocational education and training, and support
for small and medium enterprises").
42 Although there are no clear distinctions among a plurilateral agreement, a
regional agreement, and a multilateral agreement, plurilateral agreements tend to refer
to those agreements that are negotiated outside the traditional international or
regional organizations or fora. The recently negotiated Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement ("ACTA") is a good example. See generally Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and
Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1624813 [hereinafter Six Secret Fears of ACTAI (discussing
origins and ongoing negotiation of ACTA). Plurilateral agreements can also have a
"loose" regional focus. Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio, for example, define "'loose'
regional trade agreements" as "plurilateral agreements among countries which may or
may not be in somewhat close proximity to each other, but do not necessarily include
all countries from that area." Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 6, at 1, 2.




University of California, Davis
countries." Compared to multilateral agreements, which are usually
the product of compromise between a large number of parties and
therefore have diluted standards4  FTAs and EPAs can be more
effective in addressing the individual concerns and circumstances of
each party.4' For example, FTAs and EPAs can be carefully tailored to
specific local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities. They can
also target practices that are problematic for each party and seek
4 See Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading
System, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra note 39, at 3, 13 (noting that FTAs
"strengthen trade relations among partner countries and make it easier to build
alliances for WTO reforms in areas of common interest").
1 See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 223 (Anthony D'Amato &
Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (noting that "the need to achieve concurrence among
so many parties often leads to less stringent standards" and that such standards "may
be difficult (if not impossible) to raise through bilateral efforts"); Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 394 ("Compared to bilateral agreements, multilateral
regimes usually result in compromises that contemplate less substantial change.").
46 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 139 (2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW]
(noting that lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to 1995 China-U.S. Agreement
Regarding Intellectual Property Rights "imposed more detailed procedural obligations
than could be provided in a multilateral agreement such as TRIPs"); Tara Kalagher
Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECoN. 327, 339 (1993) ("Bilateral agreements provide the most workable
vehicle for addressing the contentious issues surrounding intellectual property
protection."). See generally Michael Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would Be a
Blunder: What the President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 25 (1989) (discussing
bilateral agreements); Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral
Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1 (1989) (same).
" See Giunta & Shang, supra note 46, at 329 (noting that bilateral agreements
"can take into consideration the particular phases of development confronting each
country, and provide for the gradual inclusion of a developing country into the global
economy"); cf. GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw, supra note 46,
at 139 (noting that lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to 1995 China-U.S.
Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights "specified particularized
enforcement efforts for motion pictures, literary works and software"). Peter Drahos,
however, disagrees:
For the United States, there are very strong incentives for a standardization
of bilateral treaty standards. So, for example, the BIT [Bilateral Investment
Treaty] which the United States signed with Nicaragua in 1995 was based on
the prototype that the United States had developed for such treaties in 1994.
Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that the United States has
negotiated with Jordan will serve as a model for the other FTAS being
negotiated with Chile and Singapore.
Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 791. 794 (2001) [hereinafter BITs and BIPsl.
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expeditious resolution of those problems."8 As a result, they usually
incur lower political costs than multilateral negotiations and can be
completed more quickly. 9
Moreover, by enabling the participating countries to speak with a
united and louder voice, FTAs and EPAs can help increase leverage in
international negotiations.5 0 Although commentators tend to focus on
the benefits of these agreements to less-developed countries," bilateral
48 See Giunta & Shang, supra note 46, at 340 (noting that empirical evidence has
demonstrated that U.S. bilateral agreements "have generally encouraged speedier and
more substantial changes in suspect nations" after United States threatened to impose
trade sanctions on those countries); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States
Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REV. 273, 295
(1991) ("Bilateral negotiations can effectively promote U.S. interests. They can target
practices of a particular country offensive to U.S. interests and do so in an expeditious
manner. By employing direct trade sanctions against noncomplying countries, the
current U.S. bilateral effort coerces problem countries to adopt adequate standards of
protection."); Ashoka Mody, New International Environment for Intellectual Property
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 203, 225 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole
Ganz Brown eds., 1990) ("In the short-run, bilateralism is proving more effective than
multilateral efforts in furthering U.S. interests. Bilateralism is quicker and allows more
focused and tailored responses.").
4 See Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements, in
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 37 (Lorand Bartels &
Federico Ortino eds., 2006) [hereinafter RTA AND WTO] ("The pursuit of an RTA ...
can be sold more easily by politicians to their constituents because of the reciprocal
nature of the agreement. An RTA guarantees compensatory tariff reductions and
ensures that 'economic activity and investment are more balanced' than they would be
under unilateral liberalization."); see also Andrew Christie et al., Exporting the DMCA
Through Free Trade Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 211, 220 ("[Aln FTA will have a more realistic chance of
obtaining the necessary approval if it follows an already established model.").
50 See Damro, supra note 49, at 34 ("Developing counties also found regional
economic agreements as useful ways in which to leverage more aid from donor states
and international organizations. The European Union, for example, is known to
encourage regional economic integration as part of its development assistance to the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and other countries. Therefore, developing
countries that promote regional cooperation increase their chance of receiving aid
from the EU.").
" See id. ("Developing states are also able to increase their negotiating leverage in
international organizations by pooling their diplomatic resources with other members
of a regional economic agreement. Sharing similar interests in areas affected by the
RTA, these states often cooperate quite naturally and effectively vis-A-vis third
parties."); Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards
Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 345, 375 (2009) ("A
free-trade agreement can level the playing field, for example for Brazil in relation to
Mexico and Chile, both of which already have FTAs with the EC. Moreover, there is
insurance against trade defense instruments as these are generally less used against
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and plurilateral agreements have succeeded in increasing the leverage
of developed countries as well. For example, Japan pushed for the
development of regional preferential arrangements to "increase [its]
leverage within the WTO."" The negotiation of the Treaty of Rome,
which established the European Economic Community (the precursor
to the European Union), was "in part motivated by European
countries' desires to increase their leverage against the United States in
the upcoming GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
talks."53
When the negotiating partners have unequal bargaining strength,
such as in North-South FTAs or EPAs involving developed and less-
developed countries, the goal of the agreements is to provide the
needed "carrots and sticks" to induce less-powerful countries to
change their laws, policies, and standards. Oftentimes, the agreements
will lead to transplants from developed countries.5 1 Such transplants
will help overcome domestic political resistance within the negotiating
partners - whether from factions in the leadership5 or from strong
industry lobbies.56
trade partners."); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective
Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 370 (2008) [hereinafter Access to Medicines] (noting
that coalition-building strategies "will allow less developed countries to shape a pro-
development agenda, articulate more coherent positions, or even enable these
countries to establish a united negotiating front" and will "help these countries
establish a powerful voice in the international debates on public health, intellectual
property, and international trade").
52 JOHN RAVENHILL, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 123 (2005).
5 Id.
" See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAw (2d ed. 1993) (advancing concept of legal transplants); Otto Kahn-Freund, On
Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (questioning concept
of legal transplants); Julie Mertus, Mapping Civil Society Transplants: A Preliminary
Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 921 (1999)
(discussing legal transplants in Eastern Europe and Latin America).
5 See MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA AND
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 41 (1999) ("[Ain international institution such as
the WTO can help bolster China's reform leadership against powerful hard-liners.
International institutions can tie the hands of leaders in ways that the ineffectual
bilateral relationship is not able to do."); Michael E. DeGolyer, Western Exposure,
China Orientation: The Effects of Foreign Ties and Experience on Hong Kong, in THE
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1997-1998 SUMMITS: CHINESE AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 299, 300 (Peter
Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1999) (internal quotations omitted) ("[Elconomic
integration would help the reformers tilt the internal Chinese debate in directions that
would minimize, if not avoid, future economic conflicts. It would encourage and
perhaps accelerate the inevitable transformation of China's political regime."); Peter K.
Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at
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By imposing international obligations and increasing the costs of
policy changes, the agreements will also produce a lock-in effect on
domestic reforms.17 If the agreements are specifically tailored to the
needs, interests, conditions, and priorities of the negotiating partners,
they may provide an even stronger lock-in effect. As Bernard Hoekman
and Petros Mavroidis point out, these types of agreements "may offer a
stronger 'lock-in' mechanism for policy reform than the WTO, insofar
as the partners involved have stronger incentives to enforce
agreements."" Although commentators tend to see bilateral and
plurilateral agreements as gap-fillers, some regional agreements, such
as the Treaty of Rome, have had a "positive long-run impact on the
world economy. "60
Within the WTO context, the increasing use of FTAs and EPAs will
help push for new commitments that are hard to achieve in a
multilateral setting. If the agreements are motivated by trade
liberalization and are complementary to multilateral reforms, they will
help achieve what developed countries cannot through traditional
bargaining in the WTO or other international bodies. Some
commentators, in fact, have found FTAs and EPAs especially
important in view of the increasing difficulty in striking compromises
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676558 (manuscript at 43) (arguing that WTO's recent
panel report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, provides reformist factions within Chinese leadership with important
push for stronger reforms within country).
56 See Helen Milner, Regional Economic Co-operation, Global Markets and Domestic
Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty, in REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: EUROPE, ASIA AND THE AMERICAS 19, 29 (William D. Coleman
& Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 1998) ("NAFTA provided a means to lock in the trade
liberalization strategy that had been undertaken unilaterally. By joining an FTA,
Mexico could not unilaterally change its policies and return to protectionism, at least
not without incurring substantial costs. . . . This increased the credibility of its policy
moves and hence their effectiveness."); Schott, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that FTAs
"help governments to withstand the protectionist demands of their domestic lobbies
and deflect pressure to take actions that are politically alluring but economically
undesirable").
" See Schott, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that FTAs will make policy reversals
"more costly because changes that violate the free trade obligations could trigger
retaliation by trading partners").
58 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 59 (2007).
" See Schott, supra note 44, at 12 ("As long as countries proceed with WTO
reforms in tandem with their FTA initiatives, regional preferences will have a short
'half-life' and FTA partners will lack incentives to build regional fortresses designed to
shield their economies from foreign competition.").
6 Christine Lagarde, Multilateralism: The Doha Round and the Hong Kong
Declaration, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note 6, at 5, 9.
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with less-developed members in international negotiations."1 As Jeffery
Schott acknowledges, "[tthe political economy of trade liberalization
and the increasing complexities of negotiating in the WTO seem to
require an admixture of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade
initiatives.""
Moreover, by relying on a "divide and conquer" approach, the
developed countries' use of FTAs and EPAs has greatly enhanced their
already strong bargaining positions, thereby helping them to avoid the
stalemate found in the WTO negotiation process. By using these
agreements, the United States and the European Union were able to
reward those who were willing to work with them while at the same
time undermining the efforts by Brazil, India, and other members of
the Group of 20 to establish a united negotiating front for less-
developed countries. As former U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick wrote in the Financial Times, the United States would separate
the "can-do" countries from the "won't-do," and it would "move
61 See Schott, supra note 44, at 17 (noting that "WTO deliberations are now the
subject of intense coalitional politics" and that "FTAs can reinforce the negotiating
dynamics required for a successful WTO round"). As Jeffrey Schott observes, the
WTO works quite differently from the GATT, and its complicated negotiation
dynamics have made it difficult for developed countries to reach agreement with those
in the less-developed world:
Most of the [WTO] members are developing countries; unlike during the
GATT era, many of them now have an important stake in international trade
and therefore an important stake in getting something out of the trade
agreements. Because each country needs to be able to bring home a trophy
to justify the concessions that they make to their trading partners, WTO
talks have to produce a big package of agreements that accommodates the
diverse interests of its large membership. Since the WTO still operates by
consensus, the task of crafting a set of agreements that meets the demands of
the large and increasingly disparate membership has become much more
difficult ....
The second major problem is that the United States and the European
Union have very little left to offer at the negotiating table in terms of market
access, except what is very difficult to give - that is, the protection in
agriculture and textiles that has survived eight previous rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations and that is of major export interest to
developing countries. In turn, developing countries seem reluctant to lower
their own generally much higher trade barriers without increased and more
secure access to industrial markets.
Id. at 16-17.
62 Id. at 17.
63 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 393 (discussing United




towards free trade with [only] can-do countries."' By reducing the
number of negotiating parties, the agreements will also enable
negotiating partners to offer each other terms that they otherwise
would not offer in a multilateral forum. 6 5
Regardless of whether the FTAs or EPAs are North-North
agreements (those between developed countries) or North-South
agreements (those between developed and less-developed countries),
these agreements can drive discussion of, or push for, reforms in two
areas. Through the introduction of "multilateral-plus" provisions -
provisions that exceed those required by the multilateral agreements
- FTAs and EPAs can increase the scope and extent of commitments
made under existing multilateral agreements. Although multilateral
agreements, in particular those in the WTO, have made it costly and
difficult for participating countries to roll back commitments, virtually
all of the existing agreements were designed as "minimum standards"
66
agreements.66 As a result, countries only have minimum obligations,
and they are free to increase their commitments, provided those
additional commitments do not interfere with the agreements' most-
favored-nations clauses or other countervailing obligations. 7
In addition to multilateral-plus provisions, bilateral and plurilateral
agreements can also introduce "multilateral-extra" provisions that
cover reforms that fall squarely outside, or have not been fully covered
by, the existing multilateral agreements.68  For example, "FTA
6. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-Do Countries, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
65 See, e.g., Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 395 ("By changing the
forum and reducing the number of negotiating parties, the United States can provide
side payments that it would not be able to offer in a multilateral forum, given the
diversity of interests the United States has vis-A-vis the contracting states.").
66 See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1.1 ("Members may, but shall not
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by
this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of
this Agreement."); Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST.
Louis U. LJ. 923, 931 (2008) ("{Tihe TRIPs Agreement introduced to all WTO
member states many uniform minimum standards on which there was no
international consensus before."). Interestingly, WTO members are somewhat
reluctant to challenge the bilateral and plurilateral agreements as noncompliant with
the WTO rules. As Jeffrey Schott explains, "virtually all WTO members are party to
some type of regional agreement, and thus don't want to throw stones at other pacts
lest their own preferential deals come under attack. As a result, the trading system has
treated FTAs with benign neglect." Schott, supra note 44, at 4.
67 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 883 (noting
tension between bilateral and plurilateral agreements on one hand and most-favored-
nation clauses on other).
' In a previous work, I noted the distinction between TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra
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provisions have established precedents for broader multilateral
accords in areas such as services and electronic commerce."69
Although multilateral-extra provisions look quite similar to
multilateral-plus provisions, the distinction between the two is
important from the standpoint of dispute resolution. Because the
WTO only requires the use of its mandatory process to settle disputes
arising under its agreements,o multilateral-extra provisions are
technically outside the WTO rules and are, therefore, open to
alternative dispute resolution approaches, including unilateral trade
sanctions.
The existence of multilateral-extra provisions, indeed, has helped
rejuvenate the United States's section 301 process, which permits the
U.S. President to investigate and impose sanctions on countries
engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States's
economic interests.7 In United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade
Act of 1974, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body stated that its rules
prohibit its members from taking retaliatory measures before
exhausting all of the permissible actions.72 Thus, even though the
Section 301 process remains intact, its effectiveness has been greatly
curtailed. With respect to measures covered by the WTO agreements,
this process remains largely reduced to a shaming exercise.
Strategically, FTAs and EPAs provide important entry points into
other regional or plurilateral networks. In doing so, they allow
provisions in the intellectual property context. See id. at 867-70; see also HOEKMAN &
MAVROIDIS, supra note 58, at 59 (noting that reciprocal preferential trade agreements
may "involve disciplines on domestic instruments that are not (yet) covered by the
WTO, providing a laboratory for countries to explore mechanisms of cooperation on
'behind the border' policies with similar or like-minded partners").
6 Schott, supra note 44, at 12.
7o Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226
(1994).
71 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (2006). Section 301, in particular, requires the United
States Trade Representative to identify foreign countries that provide inadequate
intellectual property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair
or equitable market access. Id. § 2242(a)(1)(A). See generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates
to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM.
U. L. REv. 131, 138-40 (2000) (discussing section 301 process).
7n Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 9 8.1,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
73 See, e.g., Drahos, BITs and BIPs, supra note 47, at 794 (stating that U.S.-Jordan
FTA "will serve as a model for the other FTAs being negotiated with Chile and
Singapore"); Sidney Weintraub, Lessons from the Chile and Singapore Free Trade
Agreements, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra note 39, at 79, 79 (noting that
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developed countries to explore interstate relationships with a smaller
number of countries. Such an arrangement helps reduce the
complexity and high costs of negotiation with a large number of
parties or a complex regional body. The negotiation of the agreements
also helps countries test the feasibility of applying specific models to a
particular region. In fact, because the agreements involve self-selected
parties, they allow parties to avoid negotiation of issues that would
require them to make concessions that are important to their domestic
constituencies. The exclusion of issues will also quicken the
negotiation process, as those issues tend to slow down, if not derail,
the negotiations.
Consider, for example, the United States's use of the United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement" as an entry point to the Middle East
and Northern Africa. As Jason Kearns observes:
US Trade Representative Zoellick hoped in particular that an
agreement with Morocco would lead to agreements with other
countries in Northern Africa, notably Tunisia and Algeria.
When he announced his plan to negotiate an agreement with
Morocco, he suggested that an FTA would help Morocco
'accelerate its embrace of the modern world'. He also noted
that the Administration's commitment to free trade with a
leading moderate Arab State 'sends a signal throughout a
tempestuous region: of America's support of tolerant, open,
and more prosperous Muslim societies'."
According to Professor Kearns, the United States's FTA effort with
Morocco reflected "a 'building block' approach: first ensuring that
countries accede to the WTO, then negotiating trade and investment
agreements with individual countries in the region (such as the
Agreement with Morocco), and finally reaching a comprehensive
United States-Middle East Free Trade Area."76
Such a building block approach is effective because virtually all
negotiating parties to an FTA or an EPA belong to other FTAs, EPAs,
U.S. FTAs with Chile and Singapore "are intended to be bellwethers for future FTAs in
both regions, some bilateral and others plurilateral, as well as to set the substantive
parameters for the hemispherewide Free Trade Area of the Americas").
7 United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-ftal
final-text.
1 Jason Kearns, United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, in BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 6, at 144, 145 (footnotes
omitted).
76 Id. at 146.
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or regional arrangements.17 Through the development of an ever-
growing web of agreements, FTAs and EPAs can help establish norms
that will eventually be consolidated in a multilateral setting.78 As Ruth
Okediji points out, countries may seek to "consolidate and (perhaps
improve) the gains from bilateralism" once they have developed a
network of bilateral agreements that is sufficiently dense for that
purpose.7 9 Likewise, Sungjoon Cho acknowledges: "regionalism may
contribute to multilateralism under certain circumstances through a
'laboratory effect'. After experiencing trial and error as well as
learning-by-doing in the regional level, countries may feel confident in
ratcheting these regional initiatives up to the multilateral forum."'
The development of this web of agreements may even help influence
the future development and interpretation of existing multilateral
agreements. For example, FTAs and EPAs can become customary
international law when a sufficient number of countries have adopted
" See Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO
MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note 6, at 53, 60 [hereinafter RTA Strategy] (discussing
China's focus on negotiations with those who are already members of other regional
trade agreements).
7 See IQsensato, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Global
Policy Implications, IN Focus, June 2, 2008, at 4, available at http://www.iqsensato.org/
wp-content/uploads/InFocus%20-ACTA%20-%20Vol%202%20-Issue%208.pdf ("What
appears as plurilateral in the beginning will quickly become a global standard through
FTAs and EPAs and through political and economic pressure."). Senator Max Baucus,
for example, has contended that a bilateral agreement may "provide at least a partial
model for a future multilateral agreement." Baucus, supra note 46, at 21-22. As he
explains:
By opening markets on a bilateral basis, otherwise insoluble political
problems can be attacked incrementally; bilateral agreements might break
the political ice for multilateral agreements. Once the first steps have been
taken to eliminate a trade barrier or solve an economic problem for one
nation, political problems appear less formidable and it is easier to reach
similar agreements with other nations. For example, opening the Japanese
construction market to the entire world might be extremely difficult
politically for Japanese officials. Opening it only to the United States might
be somewhat easier. Once the market is opened partially and the Japanese
industry and government become accustomed to the new situation, further
liberalization will be easier to achieve. Far from derailing the GATT, bilateral
agreements can blaze a trail that the GATT can follow.
Id. at 22.
" Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International
Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAwA L. & TECH. J. 125, 143 (2004)
[hereinafter Back to Bilateralism?].
I Cho, supra note 38, at 238 (footnote omitted); accord Guy de jonquitres,
Comment, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra note 39, at 32 (noting that FTAs
"push forward the frontiers by acting as laboratories for WTO-plus innovations").
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the same provisions in their agreements and have expressly and
consistently recognized those provisions as legal norms governing
their state conduct.' Although legislatures - such as the U.S.
Congress - may override these customary laws through legislation,
the potential of the agreements to influence the domestic legislative
and judicial processes, and their ability to shape international
discussion, should not be ignored.
Moreover, the international agreements and the network of bilateral
and plurilateral treaties might affect the country's international
obligations by forming context for interpreting treaties it has signed."
Because of the increasing overlap between intellectual property and
other issue areas,' governments and international organizations
increasingly look to these agreements as part of the overall framework
in an effort to avoid future conflicts in international obligations. In
United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, for instance,
the WTO dispute panel noted the need "to seek contextual
guidance ... when developing interpretations that avoid conflicts
within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly
contain different obligations."" While the panel in China - Measures
" See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L.
REV. 13, 56 (2006); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 398. As Andrew
Guzman observes:
To determine whether BITs evidence a sense of legal obligation on the part
of signatories ... requires an inquiry into the reasons countries sign BITs. If
BITs are signed out of a sense of obligation or to clarify a legal obligation,
they must be considered evidence of customary international law. On the
other hand, if BITs are signed for reasons unrelated, or even contrary, to a
country's sense of legal obligation, BITs are not evidence of customary
international law.
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'LL. 639, 686 (1998).
8 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[Aln act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains...."); Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-
anticircumvention, supra note 81, at 56.
83 See Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International)
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHTSoc'Y U.S.A. 585, 602-04 (2001).
8 See Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law,
40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1025-27 (2007) (discussing intellectual property "regime
complex"); Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 9-16 [hereinafter Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia] (discussing increasing complexity of international intellectual property
regime and coining term "international intellectual property regime complex").
85 Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 6.70,
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Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
rejected the use of FTAs as subsequent agreements for the purpose of
determining the obligations of WTO members, 6 the arguments for
using FTAs to provide contextual guidance may be strengthened if the
web of agreements becomes denser in the future and involves parties
appearing before the panel.
Finally, FTAs and EPAs can respond directly to non-economic
strategic concerns or provide spillover effects in non-economic areas.
For example, the European Union, which some commentators have
called the "granddaddy of RTAs," came into existence "largely as [a]
non-aggression device."" Likewise, ASEAN was established in 1967 to
"create a sense of regional identity as a means to promote conflict
prevention and cooperative security."89 As shown in both cases, the
negotiation of the agreement has "ma[d]e it easier [for countries] to
build alliances . .. in areas of common interest" that lie outside the
international trade area. 90
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000). See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development
and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733 (2001) (discussing dispute); Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage:
A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 93 (2000) (same).
86 See Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, ' 7.581, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) (rejecting use of
recently negotiated bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements as relevant
subsequent practice for defining term "commercial scale"); Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, supra note 55 (manuscript at 45) (discussing WTO panel's treatment of FTAs
and EPAs).
87 See Damro, supra note 49, at 24 ("[M]any governments enter into RTAs for
important political rather than economic reasons."); de Jonquitres, supra note 80, at
30 (noting that, in FTA context, "[p]olitics are at least as important a driving force as
economics").
8 Viet D. Do & William Watson, Economic Analysis and Regional Trade
Agreements, in RTA AND WTO, supra note 49, at 7, 10; accord Damro, supra note 49, at
31 ("The EU has received considerable scholarly attention as a case of regionalism and
provides empirical evidence of governments pursuing an RTA in order to attain
security via economic means.").
89 Damro, supra note 49, at 31; see also RAVENHILL, supra note 52, at 122 (stating
that ASEAN was established to "promote economic cooperation in an attempt to build
confidence and avoid conflict in a region that was the site of armed struggles in the
Cold War era."). See generally MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC:
ASEAN, APEC AND BEYOND 17-36 (2008) (providing in-depth discussion of ASEAN).
90 Cf. Schott, supra note 44, at 13 ("FTAs strengthen trade relations among




Like the EU and ASEAN, the United States's establishment of FTAs
is equally motivated by non-economic considerations. 9' For example,
the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement "provided the United
States [with] a means to display its strong support for Israel without
providing additional financial assistance."92 In negotiating the United
States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, "President Clinton was looking
for a way to reward King Hussein for his cooperation in the Oslo peace
process - in particular, for his mediating role between Israel and the
Palestinians during negotiations at Camp David," not to mention the
United States's strong interest in keeping Jordan in the peace process.93
By sending signals about the United States's "willingness to negotiate
FTAs with partners in the Middle East besides Israel and its
neighbors,"94 the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement
"illustrates that the impetus for a trade agreement can have more to do
with broad foreign policy concerns than with narrow commercial
interests."" Some commentators went further to acknowledge that the
United States has used FTAs to reward allies for their support in the
war on terror.96
91 See Ahmed Galal & Robert Z. Lawrence, Egypt, Morocco, and the United States,
in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra note 39, at 299, 299 ("lIlt is not surprising
. . . that political rather than economic considerations have driven US free trade
agreements ... in the Middle East.").
92 Howard Rosen, Free Trade Agreements as Foreign Policy Tools: The US-Israel and
US-Jordan Cases, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra note 39, at 51, 61.
9 Id. at 62.
9 Galal & Lawrence, supra note 91, at 327.
9 Kearns, supra note 75, at 144.
96 See Olivier Cattaneo, The Political Economy of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 45 (Simon Lester & Bryan
Mercurio eds., 2009) (noting that preferential trade agreements have been used "as an
instrument of the 'war on terror' and a reward for countries supporting US efforts in
Iraq"); Kearns, supra note 75, at 145 ("Morocco and the US agreed to negotiate an
agreement just eight months after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The US
was looking to strengthen its relationship with a reform-minded Muslim nation in the
Middle East - and to provide economic opportunities in that region as a way to
counter terrorism."); Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Australia - United States
Free Trade Agreement, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES,
supra note 6, at 6, 8 (footnote omitted) ("An unofficial suggestion is that the AUSFTA
was 'payback' for Australia's support of the Iraq war: September 11 may have been
what finally led the US to agree to the AUSFTA."); David Armstrong, Aftermath of
War, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2003, at 11 ("Experts say modem U.S. trade policy has
been tightly intertwined with this country's political objectives since the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11. Washington increasingly employs free trade agreements - which
lower tariffs and quotas - as a reward to other countries, and threatens trade
sanctions, including higher tariffs and quotas, as a punishment for nations that haven't
sided with the United States.").
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2. Weaknesses
Although bilateral and plurilateral agreements can help drive new
norms that will be eventually consolidated in a multilateral setting,
they also threaten to undermine the existing multilateral system.
Instead of "building blocks," they can serve as "stumbling blocks" that
make it difficult for multilateral organizations to achieve their
liberalization goals.97 For example, they can make the multilateral
system less appealing and thereby undermine its stability and growth.
As less-developed countries pointed out in the early days of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, it was pointless to develop the
WTO and the TRIPS Agreement if developed countries continued to
rely on unilateral measures, such as the notorious Section 301
process. 98
The agreements can also alienate a country's multilateral partners,
resulting in distractions, or even disengagement, that impede the
progress of multilateral discussions.99 The lack of such progress would
be a loss to the international community. Multilateral agreements are
generally more stable than their bilateral and plurilateral counterparts.
They are also more likely to persist in their own right even when the
interests of some signatory countries have changed.'00
9 See Damro, supra note 49, at 39-41 (discussing how RTAs can serve as "political
stumbling blocks" to WTO multilateralism); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners'
Dilemma and FTAs: Applying Game Theory to Trade Liberalization Strategy, in
CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note 6, at 21, 23 ("Government statements
often emphasize the potential for FTAs to serve as 'building blocks' that assist, rather
than 'stumbling blocks' that hinder, the WTO's ability to achieve the organization's
multilateral liberalization goals.").
9 See David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The
Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 909 (1989) (suggesting that states
might not accept new multilateral commitments in intellectual property area if they
are going to be vulnerable to unilateral actions).
" See Yu, Six Secret Fears of ACTA, supra note 42 (manuscript at 73) (discussing
how ACTA would render future multilateral discussions in area of intellectual
property enforcement more difficult); see also Cho, supra note 38, at 239 ("The
inherent discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is often blended with an
internal power disparity and ultimately begets unilateralism. Unilateralism, which is
often clad with extraterritoriality, tends to eclipse international trade law, thereby
placing the global trading system at the mercy of bare politics by a handful of
powerful states."); Leaffer, supra note 48, at 297 (arguing that bilateral agreements
"may run counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable trade environment
... [and] fragment the world trading system ... [by creating] resentment, particularly
among Third World countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as a species of
colonialism").
10 See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic
World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115, 138 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (noting
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From a practical standpoint, FTAs and EPAs can compete directly
with the multilateral system by taking away the much-needed time,
resources, and energies countries can devote to multilateral
negotiations. 01 In an ideal world, both the multilateral and bilateral
processes should work in tandem to maximize their strengths and
effectiveness. Countries, therefore, should continue to negotiate in a
multilateral forum while at the same time seeking enhancement
through FTAs and EPAs. In reality, however, countries - especially
those in the less-developed world - have very limited resources.02 As
a result, they may not have the ability to dedicate efforts to
normmaking in a multitude of competing fora. Not even developed
countries can devote the same amount of energy and resources to the
multilateral process if they also have to negotiate a large number of
bilateral and plurilateral agreements."o3
Even worse, the inherent power asymmetry in the international
trading system may create perverse incentives for more powerful
that "Irlegimes may be maintained even after shifts in the interests that gave rise to
them"). Professor Stein provided four reasons for such persistence: (1) the delays in
recalculation or reassessment of interests; (2) sunk costs involved in international
institutions; (3) tradition, legitimacy, and the reluctance to damage reputation by
breaking with customary behavior; and (4) the changing mindset from self-
maximization to joint-maximization. Id. at 138-39.
101 See Ruggiero, Comment, supra note 39, at 27 ("Negotiating bilateral and regional
agreements can divert attention and effort from the Doha Round. This in turn can
create a vicious cycle, whereby a lack of progress at the WTO spurs a greater emphasis
on bilateralism and regionalism, which in turn further hampers efforts in Geneva.").
'02 See Schott, supra note 44, at 15-16 ("[C]ountries have limited resources to
engage in trade negotiations, and FTAs clearly dilute the effort that can be directed
toward WTO initiatives. This resource scarcity problem is particularly constraining for
developing countries that have only a few officials to run domestic agencies and
participate in bilateral, regional, and WTO talks."); see also Damro, supra note 49, at
38 ("Governments have limited resources and, thus, must take care when deciding
where to direct those resources. Often following delicate internal political
deliberations, they will decide to dedicate resources to negotiations that are more
likely to reach a result than those that hold out the prospect of deadlock or minimal
returns.").
103 See Schott, supra note 44, at 16 (pointing out that resource scarcity equally
"affects US negotiators, whose budget is inadequate to meet the extensive demands set
out in US Trade Promotion Authority by their congressional masters"); see also id. ("If
WTO talks face tough sledding, [FTA critics'] counsel is to redouble efforts at MFN
reforms rather than to create new distortions via competing preferential regimes.");
Richard N. Cooper, Comment, in FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES, supra note 39, at 20,
23 ("The United States ought to devote its negotiating and political energies to getting
a successful conclusion to the multilateral negotiations, currently the Doha Round
and some unfinished business from the Uruguay Round."); Damro, supra note 49, at
42 (noting that multilateral liberalization could slow down "as governments shift
attention and resources toward the negotiation of regional agreements").
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countries to "advance self-interested agendas because they have failed
to get them accepted in the WTO."'" While competitive liberalization
can be beneficial when it accelerates trade liberalization, it can also
impede progress by creating agreements or structures that eventually
"become an alternative to the multilateral system and not an exception
subject to some conditionality under the rules of the WTO."'0o
The second concern involves the growing fragmentation of the
international regulatory system. As Jagdish Bhagwati warned us in the
mid-1990s, when the new wave of preferential trade agreements
began, the push for FTAs and EPAs can lead to the creation of a
"spaghetti bowl"106 - or in the Asian context, the "noodle bowl"'07 or
"curry bowl." Filling this bowl is "a mish-mash of overlapping,
supporting, and possibly conflicting, obligations."108 Although
"4 de Jonquitres, supra note 80, at 32.
105 Ruggiero, Comment, supra note 39, at 27.
106 Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE
DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2-3 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1995).
107 See Wang Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Free Trade
Agreement, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 6,
at 192, 224 [hereinafter ASEAN-China FTA] (noting "'Asian noodle bowl effect' as
highlighted by officials of the Asian Development Bank"); Richard Baldwin, Managing
the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism 1 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research, Discussion Paper No. 5561, 2006), available at http://www.cepr.org/
pubs/dps/DP5561.asp; Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends
and Challenges 3 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 144, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480508 (noting "a 'noodle bowl' problem of criss-crossing
agreements that potentially distort trade toward bilateral channels, excessive
exclusions and special treatment in FTAs, and the possibility that the multilateral
trading system may be progressively eroded").
"0s Lester & Mercurio, supra note 42, at 2; accord JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, A STREAM
OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND DEMOCRACY 290
(1999) ("As [preferential trade agreements] proliferate, the main problem that arises is
the proliferation in turn of discriminatory access to markets, with a whole maze of
trade duties and barriers that vary according to source."); Do & Watson, supra note
88, at 10 ("The reality of RTAs is a certain lumpiness, with the spaghetti tangled in or
around four or five discernible clumps - meatballs, perhaps, or maybe it is time to
think of a different pasta entirely."); Leal-Arcas, supra note 51, at 375 ("Further
proliferation of FTAs results in transaction costs that serve to the detriment of
multilateral trade liberalization at the WTO level, thereby provoking a fragmentation
of multilateralism."); Lewis, supra note 97, at 25 ("[Tlhe large number of FTAs has
led to a trading system with complicated and sometimes inconsistent rules due to
different rules of origin."); Schott, supra note 44, at 14-15 (expressing concern about
"domino regionalism" that "fragments the trading system into protectionist blocs or
spurs competitive liberalization that reinforces multilateral reforms" and noting that
FTAs "can create overlapping sets of trade rules and regulations that make sourcing
products to different markets complicated and often more costly").
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fragmentation has some benefits, commentators tend to agree that it
would hurt less-developed countries more than it helps them. Eyal
Benvenisti and George Downs, for example, describe three ways in
which the growing proliferation of international regulatory
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries
has helped powerful states to preserve their dominance:
First, [fragmentation] limits the ability of weaker states to
engage in the logrolling that is necessary for them to bargain
more effectively with more powerful states. . . . Second, by
creating a multitude of competing institutions with
overlapping responsibilities, fragmentation provides powerful
states with the opportunity to abandon - or threaten to
abandon - any given venue for a more sympathetic venue if
their demands are not met. . . . Third, a fragmented system's
piecemeal character suggests an absence of design and
obscures the role of intentionality. . . . This has helped obscure
the fact that fragmentation is in part the result of a calculated
strategy by powerful states to create a legal order that both
closely reflects their interests and that only they have the
capacity to alter.'09
FTAs and EPAs could also lead to what Kal Raustiala has described as
"strategic inconsistencies," which "occur[] when actors deliberately
seek to create inconsistency via a new rule crafted in another forum in
an effort to alter or put pressure on an earlier rule."' The more
bilateral and plurilateral agreements there are, the more opportunities
there will be for powerful and geopolitically savvy countries to
develop such inconsistencies.
The third concern involves the diversion of trade and investment."'
Such diversion could hurt society when trade and investment are
109 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597-98
(2007).
10 Raustiala, supra note 84, at 1027-28; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2004) (discussing legal inconsistencies generated
by development of counter-regime norms).
.. See Damro, supra note 49, at 24 ("As stumbling blocks, RTAs divert trade and
clash with the economic goals of multilateral liberalization."); Schott, supra note 44, at
13-14 ("Critics of FTAs decry the negative impact of regional pacts on global
economic welfare as trade and investment are diverted to take advantage of the
preferential trading regime, and the distraction - or even disengagement - from
multilateral trade negotiations."). But see Jo-Ann Crawford & Sam Laird, Regional
Trade Agreements and the WTO, 12 N. AM. J. EcoN. FIN. 193, 200 (2001) ("[The
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being diverted to countries that do not provide an efficient system.
Scarce resources will be wasted, and society will be worse off."' For
example, "NAFTA caused substantial trade and investment diversion
in the textile and clothing sectors from the Caribbean Basin countries
as a result of the preferential treatment accorded Mexican industry. "
Likewise, by offering preferential treatment to some African countries,
the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act"' "seems to be having a
similar adverse effect on nonbeneficiaries in Africa and elsewhere."" 5
The concern over trade diversion was so important that the final
report of the Consultative Board to former Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi called on WTO member states "to show restraint [on the
spread of preferential treatment] or risk more damage to the
multilateral trading system."116 After all, "FTAs may beget more
FTAs.""' Because there can be an endless negotiation of bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional agreements, the development of FTAs and
EPAs can create a vicious cycle that perpetuates harm to the
international trading order.
Moreover, a preferential agreement, by definition, discriminates
some trading partners against others.1" By developing FTAs and EPAs,
countries, therefore, "make[] selected friends but also leave[] a bad
taste with other countries, which outnumber those friends by a large
margin.""' As Richard Cooper observes in relation to the U.S. FTA
negotiations with Chile: "I have nothing against Chile, but why should
the United States discriminate in favor of goods from Chile as opposed
to those coming, for example, from the Philippines or Thailand or
India? ... Discrimination means discrimination against as well as
overall numbers do not point to clear evidence of diversion away from imports from
nonmembers of RTAs.").
112 See Schott, supra note 44, at 11 (noting higher costs and inefficiencies and,
therefore, reduced welfare caused by preferential trade arrangements).
" Id. at 14; see also Weintraub, supra note 73, at 84 (noting that main motivation
behind U.S. FTAs with Chile and Singapore "is not to obtain reductions in US trade
barriers, which already are quite low (or even set at zero for Chile for many products
under the US Generalized System of Preferences), but rather to increase their
attractiveness to foreign investors").
"4 19 U.S.C. H§ 3701-41 (2006).
1' Schott, supra note 44, at 14.
116 WTO, THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 79 (2004).
117 Rosen, supra note 92, at 75.




discrimination for, and on balance such discrimination is bad
politics. "120
The fourth concern is a direct result of the power asymmetry found
in the existing international trading system. Because of such
asymmetry, FTAs and EPAs are likely to perpetuate, or even
exacerbate, the already highly vulnerable position of less-developed
countries.12 1 Even worse, by taking away these countries' ability to
form coalitions,"' FTAs and EPAs have generally made less-developed
countries more vulnerable than in a multilateral setting.123
When countries reach a North-South Agreement, that agreement
tends to favor developed countries, leading to transplants of their laws,
policies, and standards to less-developed countries. These transplants
are harmful for many reasons.124 They tend to ignore the local needs,
national interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities,
and public health conditions of less-developed countries.1 25 They may
also stifle local development, especially when the development path of
the recipient countries does not align with that of the source country.
Without taking full account of the internal problems, potential
conflicts, and lack of correction mechanisms in the recipient
countries, these agreements may even bring problems from abroad,
making the situation worse than the problems they sought to address.
120 Id.
121 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 886-92
(discussing how significant disparity in bargaining power between developed and less-
developed countries has given less-powerful countries no choice but to adopt harmful
rich-country transplants); see also Lagarde, supra note 60, at 5, 9 ("Poor countries can
be put under the thrall of economic powers.").
122 See generally Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 51 (discussing coalition
building among less-developed countries in negotiation of international agreements);
Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development, in IMPLEMENTING
WIPO's DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 79 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009) (same).
12 See William Davey, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment, in RTA
AND WTO, supra note 49, at 343, 356 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement] ("While the
same power disparities exist in the WTO, they are more effectively offset, even if they
can never be eliminated, in a multilateral setting than in a bilateral one."); Lewis,
supra note 97, at 26 ("[F]or developing countries, particularly the smaller and weaker
amongst them, their inequality of bargaining power vis-a-vis the developed countries
is far more pronounced and capable of being exploited in the bilateral negotiation
context than in the multilateral setting."); Schott, supra note 44, at 16 ("North-South
agreements are more prone to the latter owing to the asymmetric economic and
political influence of the larger, industrialized countries.").
124 See generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in
Hong Kong, 48 U. LouISVILLE L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (critiquing legal transplants
in intellectual property area).
..5 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 828.
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Given their many weaknesses, transplant-inducing treaties are likely to
form bad precedents for future multilateral efforts1 26 and thereby harm
both the individual countries and the larger international trading
system.
More problematically, North-South agreements often force less-
developed countries to discard many hard-earned bargains they had
won through the multilateral negotiation process.127 For example, less-
developed countries may have to give up procedural and substantive
safeguards and flexibilities that had been built into the multilateral
system to provide balance and promote the public interest.128 The
omission of these important safeguards and flexibilities, to some
extent, can be compared to a revision of the multilateral arrangement
without going through its carefully designed amendment process.129
Such revision, in effect, allows the more powerful countries to pick
and choose the desirable parts of the multilateral arrangement while
abandoning those they adopt reluctantly out of political compromise.
FTAs and EPAs also increase pressure on those who fail to join the
network of agreements. Given the asymmetrical international trading
system, few less-developed countries would be able to reject an offer
to enter into an agreement with their more powerful trading
partners.o Many, in fact, fear that they will be left out, creating what
Chad Damro has described as the "marginalization syndrome.""' As
126 See Schott, supra note 44, at 16 ("FTA critics charge that North-South
agreements are more prone to [yielding bad precedents] owing to the asymmetric
economic and political influence of the larger, industrialized countries.").
127 See Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?, supra note 79, at 129 (lamenting that bilateral
FTAs threaten to "roll back both substantive and strategic gains" won by less-
developed countries in multilateral process).
128 See Yu, Six Secret Fears of ACTA, supra note 42 (manuscript at 70).
129 See id. (discussing how plurilateral agreement like ACTA would revise TRIPS
Agreement without going through carefully designed multilateral amendment process
laid out in article 71.2 of Agreement).
130 See ROBIN GROSS, IP JUSTICE, IP JUSTICE WHITE PAPER ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 2 (2008) (noting that "few countries will
have the muscle to refuse an 'invitation' to join [ACTA]").
131 Damro, supra note 49, at 30. As Damro elaborates:
[Sitates will enter into RTAs because they fear being left out, or
marginalized, from important international economic and political
developments. This marginalization syndrome encourages policy-makers to
join negotiations and ultimately sign onto regional agreements that they
might otherwise have ignored or avoided.
Typically countries that are politically weak, geographically isolated, and/or
economically dependent are the most likely to succumb to this syndrome.
These countries are already concerned with their vulnerable position in the
[Vol. 44:953982
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Michael Moore, former Director-General of the WTO, observes:
"Despite all I've written about the perils of unilateralism and
bilateralism, I'd be doing it if I were in government. There's a terrible
cost to being left out."132
In light of this marginalization syndrome, FTAs and EPAs are
generally considered less legitimate than agreements negotiated
through a multilateral process, even though countries have made a
conscious decision to bind themselves to the negotiated agreements.
As William Davey points out in the dispute settlement context, "WTO
dispute settlement is viewed as more legitimate because it is less
power-based and more rule-based than RTA dispute settlement. While
RTAs may be concluded between trading partners of roughly equal
size and power, they often include parties that vary to a great degree in
relative size and power."1 3 3 To be certain, the appropriateness of some
multilateral agreements, such as the widely criticized TRIPS
Agreement,134  remains highly questioned. However, were less-
developed countries and commentators given a choice between an
FTA and EPA on the one hand or the TRIPS Agreement on the other,
most of them are likely to consider the latter a more legitimate
bargain, especially when they consider the new developments in the
Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations."
Finally, because the international trading system does not provide
the same type of safeguards and accountability as normally found in a
domestic process, powerful countries that succumb to pressure from
domestic trade groups may introduce provisions that are considered
international system and will view new regional agreements as potentially
making them even more vulnerable unless they participate. As a result, the
syndrome can create a fear-inspired, band-wagoning mentality in vulnerable
governments that do not want to be left behind.
Id.; see also Cattaneo, supra note 96, at 42 (" [T]he proliferation of bilateral/regional
trade agreements is driven by the race for leadership for some, and the fear of
exclusion for others.").
132 Mike Moore, Preferential, Not Free Trade Deals, GULF NEWS, Apr. 23, 2007,
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columniststpreferential-not-free-trade-deals-1.173593,
quoted in Lewis, supra note 97, at 31; see also Lewis, supra note 97, at 21-22
(discussing how WTO member states "are experiencing a prisoner's dilemma, in
which their dominant strategy is to pursue FTAs even though their payoff would
improve by pursuing a more focused multilateral strategy").
133 Davey, Dispute Settlement, supra note 123, at 356 (footnote omitted).
1' See generally Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REv. 369 (2006) (critiquing TRIPS Agreement).
"' See generally Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIo N.U. L.
REv. 465, 511-15 (2009) (discussing developments in Doha Round).
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highly unpopular at home.136 In fact, depending on the political
structure, politicians may pursue bilateralism and plurilateralism "to
increase their chances of being re-elected."13 ' Domestic political
payoffs, therefore, may create perverse incentives that ultimately
undermine the integrity and health of the existing multilateral system.
As Dr. Damro laments:
The domestic demand for reciprocity may lead governments to
pursue RTAs for narrow domestic political gain. They will
pursue RTAs based on their own political horizons - i.e.,
when is the next election? These domestic political
calculations are not consistently tied to the potential long-term
benefits of the liberal, multilateral trading system.13 1
Although multilateralism can create the same perverse effects, FTAs
and EPAs greatly increase these effects and the risks of having such
effects. Because of reduced complexity, a more narrow focus, and the
self-selected nature of the negotiating process, it is usually easier to
communicate the benefits of an FTA or an EPA to domestic
constituents than it would be to communicate identical or equivalent
benefits of a multilateral agreement. 3 9 As a result, politicians may
"pursue regional liberalization at the expense of multilateral
liberalization."1' They may also "try to preempt the 'erosion' of their
margins of preference by dragging their feet on WTO reforms."'
136 See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
777, 788-91 (2010) [hereinafter Political Economy] (discussing policy laundering and
backdoor lawmaking).
137 Damro, supra note 49, at 37; see also Milner, supra note 56, at 30 (citations
omitted) ("The [U.S.] administration was counting on [NAFTA] as 'a vote-winner for
President Bush'. The prospect of increased growth, competitiveness and jobs
motivated political leaders. Domestic politics also shaped the Canadian government's
attitudes: 'Like President Bush, Mr Mulroney is expected to use positive features of the
trade agreement in his own bid for reelection.' ").
138 Damro, supra note 49, at 37.
13 See id. ("The pursuit of an RTA ... can be sold more easily by politicians to
their constituents because of the reciprocal nature of the agreement. An RTA
guarantees compensatory tariff reductions and ensures that 'economic activity and
investment are more balanced' than they would be under unilateral liberalization.");
see also Christie et al., supra note 49, at 211, 220 (" [Ain FTA will have a more realistic
chance of obtaining the necessary approval if it follows an already established
model.").
140 Damro, supra note 49, at 24; see also id. at 37-38 ("[If the deliverables of RTAs
are more easily communicated to domestic constituents than the deliverables of
multilateral agreements, then it is possible that RTAs could be more important for re-
election than multilateral agreements. Under such circumstances, politicians would
likely prefer regional liberalization via RTAs over multilateral liberalization via the
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Even worse, the lack of accountability and the political payoffs of a
successful international agreement may tempt politicians to engage in
what I have called "backdoor lawmaking" - "a process of outsourcing
the legislative process to an international forum of unelected
representatives in an effort to create laws that the domestic legislature
would not have otherwise enacted."l4 2 Through this backdoor process,
the administration can present to the legislature a fait accompli in an
attempt to make an end run around the domestic deliberative process.
The new-found international obligation will greatly increase the
likelihood of having the laws enacted, even though those laws would
not have been enacted based on evaluation of local needs alone. After
all, the country's international reputation is now on the line, and the
stake of not adopting laws to implement the agreement is much
higher.
Due to power asymmetry in the international trading system, FTAs
and EPAs may also lead countries to adopt provisions that are
considered controversial or legally shaky in the source country.'
Some good examples are the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of the
United States" and the efforts to push for greater criminal
enforcement through the second EU Intellectual Property Rights
Enforcement Directive, or the so-called IPRED2.14 ' Despite strong
criticisms and opposition of both measures in the European Union
and the United States, the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement seeks to incorporate norms from both sets of unpopular
WTO.").
1' Schott, supra note 44, at 14.
142 Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 81, at 54-55. See
generally David Banisar, Stopping Science: The Case of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX
253, 282-86 (1999) (discussing policy laundering); Ian Hosein, The Sources of Laws:
Policy Dynamics in a Digital and Terrorized World, 20 INFo. Soc'Y 187, 188-89 (2004)
(same); Yu, Political Economy, supra note 136, at 788-91 (same); Introduction: The Problem
of Policy Laundering, PoL'Y LAUNDERING PROJECT, http//www.policylaundering.org/
PolicyLaunderinglntro.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (same).
143 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 395-96; Yu, Six Secret Fears
of ACTA, supra note 42 (manuscript at 35-38).
" Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
"s See Lassi Jyrkki6, Smooth Criminal Harmonisation: ACTA, EU and IPR
Enforcement, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2010/04/08/smooth-criminal-harmonisation-acta-eu-and-ipr-enforcement/ (discussing
in ACTA context challenges to harmonizing intellectual property-related criminal
provisions within European Union). IPRED2 is named after IPRED, the first EU
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive. Council and Parliament Directive
2004/48, On the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45.
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provisions."' Thus, one cannot help but wonder whether those
provisions would have been included in the first place had the
provisions first gone through the domestic legislative process of all the
negotiating parties.
In sum, FTAs and EPAs have both strengths and weaknesses.
Whether they will be beneficial ultimately depends on "how the
[agreements] are crafted and the volume of trade covered, who
participates, and whether significant progress on multilateral reforms
proceeds in tandem in the WTO" or other multilateral regimes. 4 1
B. STAs
The negotiation of STAs, alongside Japan's EPAs,"' has paved the
way for a new push of regional trade agreements within Asia, which
were rare until recently. As Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio observe:
Regionalism remained a competing model, as nations in
Europe, North America, South America and elsewhere all
formed trading blocs during this period. East Asia was the only
region to eschew regionalism, while Western Europe was the
clear leader in terms of both the timing and the scope of its
economic integration, with other regions following a bit
behind."9
14 See Yu, Six Secret Fears of ACTA, supra note 42 (manuscript at 38).
147 Schott, supra note 44, at 4-5; see also id. at 16 ("FTAs can be trade creating or
diverting, can build support for or divert attention from multilateral trade
negotiations, can enhance or dilute (or both) negotiating resources, and can foster
good and bad precedents for other trade initiatives.").
"8 See sources cited supra note 6.
"' Lester & Mercurio, supra note 42, at 1; accord Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note
107, at 3 (describing East Asia as "a relative latecomer to using FTAs as a trade policy
instrument"); Schott, supra note 44, at 5-6 ("The biggest policy shift has occurred in
East Asia, where until recently Japan, South Korea, and China had totally abstained
from regional trade arrangements."). AsJeffrey Schott explains:
Several factors explain this new interest in regionalism by East Asian
countries. First, the incremental integration of China into the regional
economy has simultaneously created new opportunities for trade and
investment in a huge, underdeveloped market and fierce new competition
from China-based producers. China is rapidly becoming Korea's top trading
partner and hosts substantial Korean and Japanese foreign direct investment.
Second, Korean and Japanese trade initiatives reflect growing concerns in
those countries about the drift in multilateral negotiations and the prospects
for achieving their objectives in the Doha Round without a significant
change in their protectionist farm policies. Third, the Asian financial crisis of
1997-98 demonstrated the economic linkages between the countries in the
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Unlike FTAs or EPAs, agreements that a middle-income country,
like China, establishes are likely to be different. In previous works, I
have explained the important distinction between North-South
agreements (those established between developed and less-developed
countries) and South-South agreements (those established between
less-developed countries).' While the former are a direct result of
power asymmetry in the international trading system, the latter better
promote the mutual interests of less-developed countries.
Technically, STAs are not South-South agreements. They are not
attempts to promote South-South or Third World solidarity. They are
also not altruistic or humanitarian gestures. At best, they are East-
South agreements (an intermediate category that falls between North-
South and South-South agreements). This section outlines six of STAs'
non-exhaustive goals. The first three goals focus on economic
considerations, while the rest involves either non-economic
considerations or a combination of both economic and non-economic
considerations.
1. Natural Resources and Raw Materials
STAs seek to bring to China its much-needed energy resources,
metals, minerals, raw materials, and foodstuffs. Although China is a
large country with phenomenal economic growth, it unfortunately has a
very limited amount of natural resources. As Nicholas Lardy points out:
On a per capita basis, China is poorly endowed with most
natural resources. Per capita availability of arable land, for
example, is only 0.095 hectares, 60 percent below the world
average; per capita availability of water is 75 percent below the
world average; and per capita availability of most key mineral
resources is well under half the world average. The only
important natural resource of which China's per capita
availability is relatively high is coal. 51
region, as well as each country's vulnerability to economic problems that
beset its neighbors.
Id. at 6.
15 See Peter Bosshard, No Harmonious Global Society Without Civil Society, in
CHINA'S NEw ROLE, supra note 8, at 246, 246-47 (discussing benefits of South-South
cooperation); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 51, at 374-75 (discussing benefits of
South-South Agreement).
151 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO
KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 33 (2006) [hereinafter THE BALANCE
SHEET].
University of California, Davis
In the past two decades, China's rapid economic growth has further
exacerbated this lack of natural resources. As Lardy continues:
Between 1995 and 2005, China's energy consumption rose 80
percent, even as domestic oil production growth slowed.
Consequently, China now relies on imports to meet almost
half its petroleum demand. According to the International
Energy Agency, while China accounted for under a tenth of
global petroleum demand, it accounted for slightly more than
a third of incremental world oil consumption over 2002
through 2004, contributing materially to upward price
pressure in global markets. 15 2
Although most of the media reports thus far focus on petroleum,
natural gas, and other energy resources, China also has a very heavy
demand for other commodities. As Joshua Eisenman observes: "[I]n
2005, China consumed roughly one-third of total global output of
steel, 40 percent of cement, 26 percent of copper.""' Today, China is
"the biggest consumer of copper, tin, zinc, platinum, steel, and iron
ore; the second biggest consumer of aluminum and lead; and the third
biggest consumer of nickel."15 1 China is also "the world's top
consumer of grain and meat .... In 2004, Chinese consumed 382
million tons of grain and 64 million tons of meat.""'5 It remains a
major importer of foodstuffs and other agricultural produce from Latin
America.156 These growing demands have created a need for China to
better manage its diplomatic relations with key suppliers. 5 7
2. Trade
STAs seek to facilitate trade between China and the signatory
countries, increasing its export volume and foreign reserves while
152 Id.
153 Eisenman, supra note 19, at 39-40.
1' Teng Chung-chian, Hegemony or Partnership: China's Strategy and Diplomacy
Toward Latin America, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 19, at 84, 91.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 92-93; see also R. EVAN ELLIS, CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA: THE WHATS AND
WHEREFORES 33 (2009) ("[The Southern Cone] is rapidly becoming the 'breadbasket'
of China, with Argentina and Brazil alone supplying some 29 percent of all Chinese
food imports - principally soy products."); id. at 38 ("Chile, together with Peru,
supplies 80 percent of all of the PRC's imports of fishmeal, a major staple of the
Chinese diet.").
1" See Heginbotham, supra note 34, at 194 ("Economic growth has ... driven a
voracious appetite for raw materials, driving a new need for intensified management of
diplomatic relations with key suppliers.").
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providing diversity through access to multiple markets.158 Since
China's reopening to trade with the outside world in the late 1970s,
trade has supported its continuous growth. According to Beijing's
figures:
Between 1979 and 2005 . . . China's GDP increased from less
than $150 billion to $1.65 trillion; its foreign trade climbed
from $20.6 billion to $1.15 trillion; per capita income rose
from $190 to more than $1200; and its share of the global
economy grew from about 1 percent to nearly 4 percent.'
Today, China is the world's second largest economy, exporter, and
trading nation,16 up from the thirty-second largest trading nation
when the country was first reopened to Western trade. 6 1 Its factories
"make 70 percent of the world's toys, 60 percent of its bicycles, half its
shoes, and one-third of its luggage.... [China also] builds half of the
world's microwave ovens, one-third of its television sets and air
conditioners, a quarter of its washers, and one-fifth of its
refrigerators."162  Exports have increasingly driven the Chinese
economy, and China "accounted for about 12 percent of the growth of
global trade" in 2005. 163
Like most countries, China "encourages exports because export
sales contribute to a favorable trade balance and can earn United States
dollars or other forms of hard currency."'" While Chinese companies
were content to serve as original equipment manufacturers for foreign
firms a decade ago, they have now moved into high-end technology
18 See ELLIS, supra note 156, at 13 ("[Wlith the global economic crisis of 2008, the
economies of the United States and Europe began to contract. The PRC has recognized
the need to diversify away from its declining traditional markets in order to maintain
its growth."); id. (quoting Jiang Shixue, Chair, Latin American Studies Department,
Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) ("[E]xpanding its market
share in Latin America has been a part of China's objective to reduce its dependence
upon the United States, Japan, and Europe.").
159 Joshua Eisenman et al., Introduction to CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD,
supra note 19, at xiii, xiv.
10 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 9 (2009)
Ihereinafter CHINA'S RISE].
161 Tahirih V. Lee, Volume Introduction to FOREIGNERS IN CHINESE LAW, at xiv
(Tahirih V. Lee ed., 1997).
162 ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY: THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOURJOB 2-3 (2005).
163 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 73.
16 Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 203, 214 (2006).
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markets, such as those for cars and regional jets.165 In 2005, China was
one of the world's five largest vehicle manufacturers, providing 5.71
million cars and trucks.'66 Meanwhile, China also tries hard to
maintain its competitive edge over low-cost products. 6 7 It is,
therefore, no surprise that some commentators have suggested that
China's export-driven economic growth will likely lead to greater
confrontations with the United States."
To be certain, Chinese products may be "of higher quality and cost
than local products" from some of its less-developed trading
partners.169 However, these products "are still much cheaper than
Korean, Japanese, Russian, or U.S. items, and thus represent a
reasonable purchase for [their] consumers." 170 Moreover, "[a]s a
developing country, China can offer products and technical advice
that are well suited to the needs of other developing countries. China's
growing demand for agricultural and mineral products is [now]
boosting the prices of commodities on the world market, and the
growth rates in exporting countries."' 7'
STAs are important from the standpoint of trade facilitation. As
Henry Gao points out, "with the exception of ASEAN and Australia,
none of China's existing RTA partners are [its] major trade
partners." 7 2 Many of these agreements, therefore, will provide the
161 See id. at 207-08; SHENKAR, supra note 162, at 161-62.
166 Loren Brandt et al., International Dimensions of China's Long Boom, in CHINA'S
RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 14, 28 (William W. Keller & Thomas G.
Rawski eds., 2007) [hereinafter BALANCE OF INFLUENCE].
167 See SHENKAR, supra note 162, at 161-62; Chow, supra note 164, at 207-08.
'6 See PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE THEY WILL BE FOUGHT
AND How THEY CAN BE WON 3 (2007).
s'6 Matthew Oresman, Repaving the Silk Road: China's Emergence in Central Asia, in
CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 19, at 60, 71.
170 Id.; see also IAN TAYLOR, CHINA'S NEw ROLE IN AFRICA 180 (2009) ("African
consumers are benefiting - particularly those with limited incomes. And much of
Africa's manufacturing industry collapsed long ago, well before Chinese imports
appeared on the scene."); Lucy Corkin, China's Strategic Infrastructural Investments in
Africa, in CHINA'S NEw ROLE, supra note 8, at 134, 136 ("Africa consumers are more
likely to be swayed by the price tag than the brand name of products on the shelves.");
Stephanie Rupp, Africa and China: Engaging Postcolonial Interdependencies, in CHINA
INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 65, 69 (Robert 1. Rotberg ed., 2008)
[hereinafter CHINA INTO AFRICA] (quoting elderly man from Cameroon: "I have
worked as a warder with the government of Cameroon for over forty-three years, but
my meager salary could not allow me to buy a television set. Today, with my pension
allowance, I have bought a cheap Chinese-made television, which if I handle well will
serve me for some time.").
171 Bosshard, supra note 150, at 246.
"I Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note 77, at 60. He also explains the significant benefits
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needed building blocks for greater trade relationships with other
countries or regions. As Professor Gao continues:
So far, China has concluded FTAs, or entered into
negotiations, with almost every major region in the world,
including Europe, America, Middle East, Africa, East and
South East Asia, South Asia and Oceania. In each region,
China usually selects one trade partner to start the
negotiations. . . . One thing all these RTA partners share in
common is that they are either RTA themselves, such as the
ASEAN and Gulf Cooperation Council, or are members of
another RTA deal. For example, Iceland is a member of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which has free trade
relationship with EU via the European Economic Area (EEA);
Chile is an associate Member of both the MERCOSUR and the
Andean Community; while India and Pakistan are both
Members of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC). "'
By taking advantage of preexisting regional or plurilateral
arrangements and using them as entry points, STAs, like FTAs and
EPAs, effectively and efficiently enable China to tap into new markets.
to establishing FTAs with these non-major trade partners:
China is always one of the top five trade partners with these economies.
Thus, while China could afford to ignore these economies, none of them
could afford to ignore China. With such an asymmetric trade relationship,
China could have more bargaining power in the RTA setting than at the
multilateral level. This is very important for China as it does not have much
experience in trade negotiations. By focusing on RTAs with those economies
which are of minor importance to China, China could divert some of the
trade with its major trading partners, so that it could further balance and
diversify its import sources and export markets and would not be overtly
reliant on one or several economies. At the same time, these RTA partners
will have a lot of their trade diverted to China. This would further increase
their reliance on China and further strengthen China's bargaining power and
political clout.
Id. at 60-61.
173 Id. at 60; accord Monica Hirst, A South-South Perspective, in CHINA'S EXPANSION
INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 90, 100 ("Some analysts argue that
[China's] agreement with Chile has allowed this country to become a 'platform' for
trade and services with the Southern Cone.").
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3. Foreign Direct Investment
STAs seek to attract foreign direct investment ("FDI") from the
signatory countries. As Peter Navarro wrote in 2007, "[slince 1983,
FDI [in China] has grown from less than $1 billion a year to more than
$60 billion, and it is projected to soon reach $100 billion annually.""
Today, China is already one of the world's largest recipients of FDI
with capital inflows of about $50 billion, behind the United States and
the United Kingdom (as well as Germany according to some studies).175
As Robert Sutter observes in the ASEAN context: "By the end of 1991,
the ASEAN states had committed $1.41 billion in 1,042 projects
approved by Beijing. Singapore led the ASEAN states in trade and
investment in China. By mid-1994, Singapore became China's fifth-
largest overseas investor after Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States,
and Japan."'76 The influx of FDI not only provides China with the
foreign capital needed for economic modernization, but also results in
technology transfer, job creation, development of human capital, and
generation of tax revenues.177 Although economists have pleaded for
caution in considering the benefits of FDI to recipient countries,178
there is no denial that the influx of foreign capital has contributed to
China's recent rise to emerging superpower status.
4. Diplomatic Ties
STAs seek to strengthen China's diplomatic ties with the signatory
countries. These strengthened ties are particularly important in light
of the dispute over China's territorial and historical claims to Taiwan
and questions concerning the autonomy of Tibet. Through the
negotiation of these agreements, China ensures that the signatory
countries adhere to a "One China Policy" that was designed to isolate
Taiwan and promote Taiwan's unification with the mainland. The
closer cooperation also helps ward off attempts to provide external
174 NAVARRO, supra note 168, at 13.
1" Daniel Chow, The Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International Trade
and Foreign Direct Investment, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 187, 198 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH].
176 SUTTER, supra note 22, at 184.
"7 See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
191-99 (1990).
178 See Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging




support to separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang."' Moreover, strong
diplomatic ties with the STA partners will become readily available
when China is criticized for its disturbing human rights records, low
environmental standards, or inhumane treatment of ethnic minorities.
Within the increasingly complex and fragmentary international
regulatory environment,'so strengthened diplomatic ties will also bring
China more bargaining power, a louder voice, and a greater number of
allies in the relevant fora. Such ties, in turn, would help alleviate
China's "peculiar siege mentality and ... persisting sense of
insecurity."18
5. International Goodwill
STAs seek to cultivate goodwill among China's neighbors and to
respond to concerns about the security and economic threats that
emerged as a result of its rise in power.'8 2 In the late 1990s, Chinese
leaders and policymakers developed the concept of a "peaceful rise"
(heping jueqi) to "reassure the world that [China] will pursue a
different development path than did Germany and Japan in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - a path based not on
aggressive changes to the international order, but instead on
1' See BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 120 (noting that, in
recent years, China developed relations with Central, South, and Southeast Asia, and
Middle East in effort to reduce "cross-border influence into its western-most ethnic
minority regions, particularly Xinjiang" and to "prevent encouragement of
'separatism' "); Adama Gaye, China in Africa: After the Gun and the Bible ... A West
African Perspective, in CHINA RETURNS To AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT
EMBRACE 129, 138 (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008) thereinafter CHINA RETURNS TO
AFRICA] (noting "China's quest to get diplomatic support in Africa" and stating that
"[clonsolidating the positions it has built over the recent years, reversing Taiwan's
diplomatic gains obtained in the mid-1990s and enhancing Beijing's new global
geopolitical ambition are the main reasons behind the more dynamic foreign policy
pursued across the continent").
180 See generally Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 109 (discussing increasingly
complex and fragmentary international regulatory environment); Yu, Intellectual
Property Schizophrenia, supra note 84, at 13-21 (same).
"' Wang Fei-Ling, Self-Image and Strategic Intentions: National Confidence and
Political Insecurity, in IN THE EYES OF THE DRAGON: CHINA VIEWS THE WORLD 21, 31
(Deng Yong & Wang Fei-Ling eds., 1999).
182 See generally CHINA'S FUTURE: CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted
Galen Carpenter & James A. Dorn eds., 2000) (discussing so-called China threat);
BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TARGETS AMERICA (2000)
(same); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA'S PLAN To DOMINATE ASIA AND THE WORLD
(2000) (same); NAVARRO, supra note 168 (same).
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benevolent principles of mutual benefit."'83 Further reinforcing this
concept are the country's strategy of "peace and development" in the
early 1980s,' its emphasis on the development of a multipolar world
in the early 1990s following the disintegration of the Soviet Union,18 5
the introduction of a "new security concept" in the late 1990s,' 6 and
the use of slogans like "becoming friends and partners with neighbors"
or an "amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighborhood." 87
To some extent, the active development of the "benevolent power"
image by the present Chinese leadership reminds one of Deng
Xiaoping's plea for practicing self-restraint in the early 1990s. As he
reportedly said after the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989:
" [W]atch and analyze developments calmly; secure our own positions;
deal with change with confidence; conceal our capacities; be good at
keeping a low profile; never become the leader."8 8 Like Deng, Chinese
leaders have stated explicitly and frequently that China is not
interested in achieving "regional hegemony or international leadership
(except perhaps in the context of promoting the interests of the
developing world)."'" According to Wen Jiabao, the current Chinese
13 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 121; see also David
Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First
Century, in POWER SHIFT, supra note 9, at 23, 29-41 [hereinafter Return to the Middle
Kingdom?] (discussing factors that affect Beijing's new proactive diplomacy around its
periphery). See generally STEVE CHAN, CHINA, THE US AND THE POWER-TRANSITION
THEORY: A CRITIQUE (2007) (explaining why China is unlikely to provoke United
States despite its rising power).
18' See Kurt M. Campbell, Foreword to CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra
note 19, at ix, x.
' See BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 128-29.
186 Teng, supra note 154, at 88-89.
187 Michael A. Glosny, Stabilizing the Backyard: Recent Developments in China's
Policy Toward Southeast Asia, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 19, at
150, 150.
" Teng, supra note 154, at 88 ("[Wlatch and analyze developments calmly
[lengjing guanchal; secure our own positions [chenzhuo yingful; deal with change with
confidence lwenzhu zhenjiao]; conceal our capacities [taoguang yanghuil; be good at
keeping a low profile [shanyu shouzhuol; never become the leader [juebu dantou]."). In
the context of China's foreign policy, the oft-misinterpreted phrase "taoguang
yanghui" has been particularly controversial. See Verna Yu, "China Threat" Hangs on a
Phrase, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 2010, at 4.
189 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 121; see also William W.
Keller & Thomas G. Rawski, Asia's Shifting Strategic and Economic Landscape, in
BALANCE OF INFLUENCE, supra note 166, at 3, 6 ("Some may suggest that China's policy
of economic engagement and commercial diplomacy in Asia is merely tactical, a
'charm offensive' designed to buy time until China is economically and militarily
powerful enough to exert regional hegemony."); Robert I. Rotberg, China's Quest for
Resources, Opportunities and Influence in Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra note 170,
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premier, China is more correctly seen as "a friendly elephant"'90
(youhao de daxiang) - a well-crafted image that is appropriate for a
"status quo power" that poses no threat to its neighbors despite its
enormous size.191 It is, therefore, no surprise that some commentators
have questioned whether China could eventually become a vocal
leader of the less-developed world, like Brazil and India have been.192
at 1, 2 [hereinafter China's Quest] ("Despite what Washington may believe, China is
not using its engagement with Africa primarily to humble the United States or Europe,
or to score political points in the ongoing battle for global hegemony."); Xiang Lanxin,
An Alternative Chinese View, in CHINA'S EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
supra note 25, at 44, 44 ("[Iun Washington, there is a growing suspicion that China
has a well- thought-out design or grand strategy to undermine the traditional U.S.
dominance in [Latin America]. In reality, however, China has yet to define the nature
of its relationship with [the region].").
190 KANG, supra note 10, at 131.
191 Id. at 80.
192 See BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RISE, supra note 160, at 224 ("China's interest in
keeping a relatively low profile, focusing inward, and reassuring the world about the
implications of its rise has led to a reluctance to take the lead in developing new global
institutions or challenging old ones for fear of attracting unwanted attention and
taking on new responsibilities that will create unnecessary distractions for itself.");
Leal-Arcas, supra note 51, at 398-99 (footnote omitted) ("China plays a rather timid
role both in the Doha Round as well as in the WTO's dispute settlement system. China
has brought only two cases before the WTO as complainant, compared to more than
fifteen cases brought by India and more than twenty by Brazil."); Sylvia Ostry, WTO
Membership for China: To Be and Not to Be - Is That the Answer?, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEw MILLENNIUM 31, 38 (Deborah Z. Cass et al.
eds., 2003) ("It is unlikely that China will replace India as a 'leader' of a southern
block. Rather, . . . China will be pragmatic and carefully weigh the costs and benefits
for China."). But see Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual
Property Standards-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 765 (2002) (questioning
whether "India and Brazil are prepared to provide the general leadership on
intellectual property issues that they once did"); Keller & Rawski, supra note 189, at
3-4 ("China is ... emerging as a voice for East Asian economic, political and security
interests."); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 51, at 353 ("In the years to come,
China is likely to become a very important player in the WTO, even if it does not
become as vocal a leader as Brazil or India.").
It is worth noting that the interests of the less-developed world do not always
coincide with those of China. As Henry Gao points out:
Agriculture is one such example [where the interests do not coincide]: as
China imports a large quantity of agricultural products, it is actually not in
China's interest to follow the position of most developing economies and
demand the elimination of export subsidies. Trade facilitation, one of four
'Singapore Issues,' is another such example: as China exports a lot, it is
actually in the interest of China to push for the inclusion of trade facilitation
in the WTO framework to make the customs process more efficient and
cheaper.
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In addition to these new concepts, phrases, images, and policy
formulations, China has taken proactive measures to reach out to its
neighbors to assuage their fears. For example, in 2000 Premier Zhu
Rongji offered to establish a free trade area between China and
ASEAN, to the surprise of Southeast Asian leaders.1 3 As one Southeast
Asian diplomat recalled: "We were shocked that the Chinese would
come up with a deal."' During the Asian financial crisis, China also
helped Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian neighbors - countries
that have been largely ignored by the United States.'9 5 Today, many
Asian leaders still express their appreciation for China's assistance at
this critical point in time and its decision not to exacerbate the crisis
by devaluing the renmenbi.'96 Such devalution would have harmed the
affected countries by creating fiercer competition from cheaper
Chinese products.
Furthermore, STAs and the preferential tariff schemes under the
"Early Harvest Programs" (zaoqi shouhuo) in these agreements offer to
its neighbors more generous terms than China is required to under an
arm's-length negotiation between an emerging power and its less
powerful neighbors. Such terms not only help China alleviate
Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note 77, at 64.
193 See JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: How CHINA'S SOFT POWER IS
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 95 (2007).
19 Id.
'9 See id. at 33-36; SUTTER, supra note 22, at 178. More problematically, the United
States has chosen to provide assistance to Mexico a few years before the Asian
financial crisis. As one commentator laments:
Unwisely, the United States turned its back on Thailand when its currency
collapsed, triggering the crisis, even though Washington had extended help
to Mexico when the peso crashed in 1994. This contrasting behavior
seriously undermined confidence in the United States and convinced Asians
that no non-Asian power or institution can be counted on to help.
Ellen L. Frost, China's Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat?, in BALANCE
OF INFLUENCE, supra note 166, at 95, 105.
116 See Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note 77, at 57 ("China's decision to not devalue its
currency was widely appreciated among ASEAN States as an important factor in
helping them go through the period: anyway, should China decide to float the Yuan,
the ASEAN States would face more fierce competitions from cheaper Chinese
products, and this could have greatly exacerbated their problems."); see also SUTTER,
supra note 22, at 178 ("Beijing's careful responses to the crisis, including its pledges to
maintain economic growth, eschew devaluation of the Chinese currency, support IMF
rescue efforts, and provide supplementary support of $1 billion to Thailand and a
reported several billion dollars to Indonesia, were well received in the region.");
Glosny, supra note 187, at 155 (noting that ASEAN was highly "appreciative of
China's steadfast refusal to devalue the Renminbi, which would have set off another
round of competitive devaluations and done more damage to ASEAN").
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concerns about its dramatic rise, but also help spread the country's
goodwill while improving its global image. 97 Together with the
"[giovernment-sponsored infrastructure development, language
schools, educational exchanges, and other forms of aid and
assistance," these strategies have greatly increased China's soft
powerl9 at a time when the United States's soft power was in dramatic
decline during the Bush administration following the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.199 Joshua Kurlantzick, therefore, describes these
strategies as China's "charm offensive."2" Meanwhile, Chinese
commentators consider them a mere reflection of the country's
emerging great power mentality (daguo xintai).20 '
To some extent, China's recent encounter with the less-developed
world reminds one of its imperial tributary system.202 Under this
197 KURLANTZICK, supra note 193, at 95; Eisenman et al., supra note 159, at xiii.
198 "Soft power" is defined as "the ability to get desired outcomes because others
want what you want." ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE 220 (3d ed. 2001). To some extent, soft power is quite similar to
the teaching of Sun Tzu: "[Slupreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's
resistance without fighting." SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 23 (James Clavell ed. & trans.,
Penguin Books 1981) (c. 600 B.C.E.), quoted in Juliana W. Chen, Comment, Achieving
Supreme Excellence: How China Is Using Agreements with ASEAN to Overcome Obstacles
to Its Leadership in Asian Regional Economic Integration, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 655, 655 n.3
(2007).
' See Eisenman et al., supra note 159, at xiii. But see BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA's RISE,
supra note 160, at 229 ("The United States ... arguably still has a greater reservoir of
global respect and appreciation than does China, which is a nascent player on the
world stage with an uncertain future.").
200 KURLANTZICK, supra note 193; see also THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 34310, CHINA'S "SOFT POWER" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34310.pdf.
201 See KURLANTZICK, supra note 193, at 36.
202 Lillian Craig Harris made a similar observation more than two decades ago. As
she observed: "Under the influence of its historical legacy, the PRC finds itself in one
sense modeling its Third World behavior on an idea that is practically as old as China
itself." LILLIAN CRAIG HARRIS, CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD 9
(1985). In essence, the imperial tributary system was a "hierarchical system of
'international relations' . . . [that was] based on an extension of the Confucian idea of
proper relations between individuals." IMMANUEL C.Y. HSO, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA
130 (6th ed. 2000). As historian Immanuel Hsia describes:
During Ming and Ch'ing times, tributary relations had been refined into a
highly ritualistic performance, with clearly defined rights and duties on the
part of each participant. To China fell the duty of keeping proper order in
the East and Southeast Asian family of nations. It recognized the legitimacy
of tributary kings by sending envoys to officiate at their investitures and by
conferring on them the imperial patents of appointment. It went to their aid
in times of foreign invasion, and sent relief missions and commiserative
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system, China, or the Middle Kingdom, occupied the position of
leadership, while its neighbors - Korea, the Ryukyus, Annam
(Vietnam), Siam (Thailand), Burma, Laos, and a host of other
peripheral states in Southeast and Central Asia - accepted the status
of junior members. These junior members were expected to "[honor]
China as the superior state by sending periodic tribute, by requesting
the investiture of their kings, and by adopting the Chinese calendar,
i.e. recording events of their countries by the day, month, and year of
the reign of the Chinese emperor." 03 In return, China offered aid in
times of foreign invasion, sent relief missions and commiserative
messages in times of disaster, and generally provided more gifts to its
less powerful neighbors than it received from them during tributary
missions.204
Although China is very unlikely to resurrect this tributary system,205
or have the intention to do so, Chinese leaders are unlikely to forget
this piece of imperial history when contemplating relations with other
messages in times of disaster. On their part, the tributary states honored
China as the superior state by sending periodic tribute, by requesting the
investiture of their kings, and by adopting the Chinese calendar, i.e.
recording events of their countries by the day, month, and year of the reign
of the Chinese emperor.
The size, frequency, and route of the tributary mission were fixed by China
- usually the closer the relationship the larger and more frequent the
mission. For instance, Korea paid tribute four times a year, presenting it all
at the end of the year, Liu-ch'iu [the Ryukyus] twice every three years,
Annam once every two years, Siam every three years, and Burma and Laos
every ten years.
Id. at 131. Although the system originated as "a policy of 'peace and kinship' [to]
appeas[e] nomad leaders with lavish gifts, entertainment, and even betrothal to Han
princesses," the system was converted over time "to frame the ritual exchanges as a
barbarian 'tribute' to the superior (virtuous) Chinese empire." Derek Mitchell &
Carola McGiffert, Expanding the "Strategic Periphery": A History of China's Interaction
with the Developing World, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 19, at 3,
8. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties - the time shortly before the doors of China
were forced open to Western trade - "Itiributary states received trade benefits, and,
in some cases, security guarantees, while China got strategic peace of mind,
reaffirmation of its self-regard, and an effective means of saving the cost of
maintaining a large standing army to patrol all its borders." Id. at 9.
203 HsO, supra note 202, at 131.
204 See Mitchell & McGiffert, supra note 202, at 8.
205 See KANG, supra note 10, at 82-83 (discussing how changing power dynamics
and conditions in Asia have made resurrection of tributary system very unlikely);
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Asian countries. Moreover, as Chan Heng Chee, Singapore's
ambassador to the United States, reminded us: "Dynastic China's
relations with Southeast Asia were to a large extent based on 'soft
power.' . . . It was China's economic power and cultural superiority
that drew these countries into its orbit and was the magnet for their
cultivation of relations."2 06 The goodwill and soft power China has
earned in recent years undoubtedly have made the country attractive
to its neighbors for greater and closer trade relationships.
6. Market Economy Status
STAs seek to improve China's position within the WTO. When
China joined the WTO, it made significant concessions. To the
Chinese, joining the WTO is not only an economic issue, but one that
affects national pride; it concerns China's rightful place in the world
after "a century of humiliation."2 07 As Zhang Yunling and Tang
Shiping acknowledge: "Chinese leaders since Sun [Yat-sen]'s time
have always believed that China rightly belongs to the 'greater power'
(da guo) club by virtue of its size, population, civilization, history,
and, more recently, its growing wealth." 208 Thus, China is willing to
make significant sacrifices to join the WTO - or, as Samuel Kim puts
it, "to gain WTO entry at almost any price." 209 Now that China has
become a member of this exclusive club and has greatly improved its
international standing, it is understandable why it wants to use its
bargaining leverage and emerging power status to "renegotiate" some
of these WTO-related concessions.
Just as developed countries are eager to develop FTAs or EPAs to
achieve political or other non-economic goals,o China is eager to
develop STAs with those who are willing to recognize its status as a
market economy, which is important to China for both economic and
non-economic reasons. Economically, such a status "will enable [the
country] to better resist anti-dumping actions in [the] WTO."2 1 For
206 KANG, supra note 10, at 3 (quoting Chan Heng Chee, Singapore's ambassador to
United States).
207 See generally Hso, supra note 202, at 139-219, 295-350, 387-406 (providing in-
depth discussion of century of humiliation).
'08 Zhang & Tang, supra note 9, at 48-49.
" Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A REASSESSMENT:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary Foot eds., 2004)
[hereinafter DOES CHINA MATTER?].
210 See discussion supra notes 87-96.
211 Barry Sautman & Yan Hairong, Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links
with Africa, in CHINA'S NEw ROLE, supra note 8, at 87, 104. As Professor Gao explains:
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example, in recognizing China as a market economy, New Zealand has
agreed to "waive discriminatory [anti-dumping] measures under.. .
China's WTO accession protocol."212 As Professor Gao points out,
China's strategy is quite clear: "As more and more economies
recognize China's market economy status, there would be mounting
pressures on those who still deem China as a non-market economy to
do just the same.""
Outside the economic realm, it is also important for China to
acquire market economy status. Such a status will help China develop
its emerging identity while providing the country with the much-
needed recognition of its economic progress. In particular, the status
would acknowledge the rapid, enormous, and continuous economic
reforms China has undertaken in the past two decades. By elevating
China to full membership of the WTO, the market economy status
would eliminate the impression that China remains a second-class
citizen in the international trading order. Such an impression would
directly address the humiliation Chinese leaders and the populace feel,
especially when viewed against the background of semicolonial rule in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."
As China is an economy with a long history of government planning in
economic development, during its accession process, many WTO Members
suspected that the Chinese government still interfered with micro-economic
activities and thus doubted that the market data in China was really reliable.
Thus, Section 15(a) of the Accession Protocol allows WTO members to
deem China as a non-market economy in antidumping investigations. The
first step in antidumping investigations involves the determination of the
existence of dumping, which is derived by comparing the export price and
normal value. Normal value is usually the sale price of the product in the
exporting economy. This provision, however, would allow WTO Members
to disregard the domestic sale price in China and use the prices from some
surrogate economies or a constructed price. Because the comparative
advantages of China mostly come from the low costs of its factors of
production, this provision makes it more likely for other WTO Members to
arrive at a higher normal value and thus easier to determine the existence of
dumping. This mechanism is available to WTO Members for up to 15 years
after China's Accession.
Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note 77, at 61.
212 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Yee Wong, Prospects for Regional Free Trade in Asia 9
(Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 05-12, 2005), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp05-12.pdf.
" Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note 77, at 61.
214 See generally Hso, supra note 202, at 139-219, 295-350, 387-406 (discussing
semicolonial rule in China in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and many
"unequal treaties" China was forced to sign).
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New Zealand was the first developed country to sign a STA, because
it is "the first industrialized country to grant China market economy
status." 21 Likewise, China signed the first STA in Latin America with
Chile21' and initiated discussions with Iceland,m' because both
countries were the first to grant China market economy status in their
respective continents.n1 To date, virtually all of China's STA partners
are countries that have recognized China's market economy status.219
215 HUFBAUER & WONG, supra note 212, at 9.
216 Chile "was the first nation in South America to establish formal diplomatic
relations with China, doing so in January 1971. The watershed event actually had its
antecedents in the formation of Latin America's first bilateral cultural friendship
association, between Chile and China in 1952." ELLIS, supra note 156, at 35.
Economically, Chile ranks the highest in the global competitive index among Latin
American countries. As a resource-exporting country, Chile also matches well with
China's needs. See Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz, Introduction: Assessing the
Implications of China's Growing Presence in the Western Hemisphere, in CHINA'S
EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 1, 17 ("Natural-resource-
exporting economies like Chile and Peru are among the most complementary vis-A-vis
China and have thus experienced big windfalls.").
Interestingly, Chile was also the first Latin America country to sign a bilateral
agreement with the United States. Id. at 12 ("Santiago was pessimistic about the
prospects for Mercosur ... and increasingly put off by the fiery anti-American rhetoric
of Venezuela and the obstructionist tactics of Brazil and others, so it seized an
opportunity to conclude an agreement with the United States.").
217 As Marc Lanteigne explains:
The Iceland negotiations permitted Beijing to engage a European economy
in PTA [preferential trade agreement] talks while bypassing the complexities
of the EU itself. The small island state's role in the European economy is
distinct, as while Iceland remains hesitant to join the EU, it is a member of
the European Economic Area, a single market for European goods and
services as well as labour. Reykjavik also implemented the EU's Schengen
Agreement in 2001, which abolishes border controls with most Union
members. Iceland therefore has acted as a useful window, or as one
Reykjavik official termed it, an "ice-breaker," for China's commercial
diplomacy in Europe without committing Beijing to complex deals with the
European Union. At the same time, the conclusion of a PTA with Iceland
would offer Beijing a lofty vantage point from which to view the rest of the
European economy, providing greater understanding of the Union's
liberalized trade preferences while discovering the potential challenges to
greater Chinese engagement with the EU economy.
Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: Cross-Regionalism and the China-Iceland
Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362, 370-71 (2010) (footnotes omitted)
(providing up-to-date and excellent discussion of China's ongoing bilateral
discussions with Iceland).
21 Jiang Yang, China's Free Trade Agreements and Implications for the WTO,
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p250869-index.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
219 Chen, supra note 19. From the diplomatic standpoint, recognition can be quite
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It is, therefore, logical to consider awarding China such a status and
accepting China's claims to Taiwan as implicit preconditions for
beginning STA negotiation.2 20
In sum, STAs serve a number of different strategies. Yet, they do not
seem to reflect the existence of any grand unified theory. Rather, as
Kurt Campbell points out, "China's strategy toward the developing
world remains largely a work in progress." 22 1 The six different goals
outlined in this Part are by no means exhaustive, and new goals are
likely to be added as China continues to grow and as countries pay
more attention to bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
Ill. CHINA'S STA STATECRAFT
While there are both similarities and differences between the
underlying goals of STAs and those of FTAs and EPAs, the strategies
China thus far has deployed to develop these agreements are rather
different. The nature and content of the agreements and China's
different negotiating approaches, undoubtedly, have dictated some of
these differences. However, a key factor seems to be China's vehement
rejection of the United States's aggressive demands for drastic internal
reforms and China's intention to place these demands in a negative
light.2 2 China's reaction to these demands is understandable. Being a
middle-income country, China is sandwiched between the European
Union and the United States on the one hand and other less-developed
countries on the other. Although its dramatic rise has created both
economic and security-related concerns among its neighbors, it
continues to face significant pressure from the European Union and
the United States. As a result, STAs have different characteristics. This
Part examines five of these characteristics and the different approaches
used to negotiate STAs.
important. For example, former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick
acknowledged that "Morocco 'was the very first nation to recognize the sovereignty of
a newly independent United States.'" Kearns, supra note 75, at 145 (quoting Robert
Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep.).
220 See Heginbotham, supra note 34, at 199; Jiang, supra note 218, at 10; see also
Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects - China-Africa Trade: A New
Fair Trade Arrangement, or the Third Scramble for Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
505, 533 (2008) ("Regarding Taiwan, China has not hidden the fact that one of the
reasons for pursuing relations with African states is to influence the relationship of
those states with Taiwan.").
221 Campbell, supra note 184, at xi.
222 See discussion infra Parts Ill.A, II.D, IIl.E.
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A. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Non-interference
STAs tend to be governed by the principles of national sovereignty,
self-determination, and non-interference in the internal matters of
others. China's policy of nonintervention grew partly out of its past
history as a semicolonial state and partly out of concerns about the
foreign powers' intervention in its internal matters. As a Chinese
diplomat chortled: "Non-intervention is our brand, like intervention is
the Americans' brand."223 The policy of non-interference, indeed, may
explain why STAs and aid and assistance packages from China often
come without any condition of internal reforms. The terms in STAs
contrast significantly with those in other agreements or aid packages
from the United States, the European Union, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and other traditional donors or lenders.
Those donors or lenders would require the recipient countries to
introduce political and economic reforms, such as "restrictions on
macroeconomic policy, reductions in public spending and
commitments to transparency as well as, in some cases, the holding of
democratic elections. "224 As Shalmali Guttal points out: "What China
argues for is the sovereign rights of governments to shape their own
development strategies and to make decisions about projects and
policies regardless of social, environmental and governance
implications." 2 5  Such an approach is particularly appealing
considering the fact that many of the reforms advocated by the
traditional donors or lenders have not greatly alleviated poverty in the
less-developed world.226
223 CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR HEGEMON? 60 (2007).
224 Id. at 105; see also Sautman & Hairong, supra note 211, at 104-06 (discussing
different approaches involving tied and untied aid in Africa).
225 Guttal, supra note 8, at 17, 32; see also Gaye, supra note 179, at 138 ("We don't
believe that human rights should be above sovereignty issues." (quoting He Wenping,
Director of Africa Department of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)); Denis M.
Tull, The Political Consequences of China's Return to Africa, in CHINA RETURNS TO
AFRICA, supra note 179, at 111, 118 (noting that "unconditional respect for national
sovereignty [that] makes any attempt to interfere into the domestic affairs of a state
illegitimate"). But see Guerrero & Manji, Introduction to CHINA'S NEW ROLE, supra note
8, at 1, 3 ("Just like Western powers, China has used aid strategically to support its
commercial and investment interventions in Africa.").
226 As Shalmali Guttal continues:
A fact unpalatable to traditional donors and lenders in Africa and Asia is that
it is their own unbending insistence on destructive neoliberal policy reforms
and dismal track records in alleviating poverty that have rendered China a
welcome alternative source of development capital among many developing
countries.... China's 'win-win' strategy is attractive for many developing
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This strategy has backfired on China's interests, however, sometimes
coming at a high cost to China's international standing. For example,
during the attacks on shops owned by ethnic Chinese in Indonesia
toward the end of the Suharto administration, Chinese leaders were
put into a Catch-22 situation in which they had a difficult time
developing a response. If they did not intervene, they would not have
been able to protect the interests of Chinese nationals abroad. If they
did, however, their intervention would lead to the erosion of the
principle of non-interference. In the end, China stayed put, and its
reaction to the attacks contrasted significantly with the approach it
took during the Mao era. As Joshua Kurlantzick recounts:
During the Maoist period in the mid-1960s, when some
Indonesian rioters had targeted Chinese Indonesians, Beijing
had stepped in, offering refuge for ethnic Chinese fleeing the
archipelago... . Th[el callous approach [China recently took
in response to the recent attacks therefore had] alienated some
diaspora Chinese, but, as interviews with Chinese officials
suggest, it was part of a strategy by Beijing to assure its
neighbors that it would not intervene in their affairs.
Similarly, China has to make difficult choices concerning how to
address charges of genocide in the western region of Darfur, Sudan,
the atrocities in which have "claimed the lives of more than 300,000
Sudanese, with two million others driven from their homes and forced
into refugee camps, all at the hands of government soldiers and allied
country governments that are simply fed-up with jumping through endless
hoops for aid and credits from traditional donors that are slow to arrive and
conditioned on the adoption of a failed development model.
Guttal, supra note 8, at 26-27; see also HALPER, supra note 12, at 11 (noting "Beijing's
transformative, leading role in the rise of a Chinese brand of capitalism and a Chinese
conception of the international community, both opposed to and substantially
different from their Western version"); id. at 31 (describing China model as "an 'exit
option' from the often intrusive demands of global lenders like the World Bank and
the IMF in areas such as good governance, human rights, transparency, and pro-
Western political and market reforms"); Alden, China's New Engagement with Africa,
supra note 25, at 225 ("African governments welcome the arrival of a new strategic
partner to diversify their array of external partners or, in specific cases, to counter
Western influence.").
227 KURIANTZICK, supra note 193, at 123. See generally CHINA AND THE THIRD
WORLD: CHAMPION OR CHALLENGER? (Lillian Craig Harris & Robert L. Worden eds.,
1986) (providing historical discussion of China's engagement with Third World);
JOHN K. COOLEY, EAST WIND OVER AFRIcA; RED CHINA'S AFRICAN OFFENSIVE (1965)
(same); HARRIS, supra note 202 (same); PETER VAN NESS, REVOLUTION AND CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY: PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (1971) (same).
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Arab militias - the Janjaweed, in particular.""' Although China
"support[ed] the idea of a UN peacekeeping mission. . . [and]
pressur[ed] the Sudanese government to negotiate with rebel
forces . . . , [it] refus[ed] to accept sanctions against the regime ...
and insist[ed] that forces should only be deployed with the Sudanese
government's consent."229 By rejecting unilateral action and insisting
that peacekeeping operations be approved by the U.N. Security
Council, China successfully used multilateral rules and its veto in the
Security Council to promote its self-interests.230
Nevertheless, human rights activists and the larger international
community have heavily criticized China's support of the Sudanese
and other similarly-situated governments. 23 1 As they claimed with
respect to Sudan, Zimbabwe, and other problematic regimes, China's
support of these regimes has diluted the Western pressure on those
governments to address problems within their countries.m Its failure
to embrace higher social and environmental standards has also led to
growing resistance among African civil society groups.
2 Hany Besada, The Implications of China's Ascendancy for Africa 28 (Ctr. for Int'l
Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Paper_40-web.pdf.
229 MARK LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 128 (2008).
230 See id.
231 See TAYLOR, supra note 170, at 89-112 (discussing China's efforts in Africa as
they relate to human rights protection); Rotberg, China's Quest, supra note 189, at 12
(noting that human rights advocates have criticized China's refusal to intervene on
behalf of peace and human rights in Sudan, Kenya, and Zimbabwe as "perverse and
obstructionist").
232 See, e.g., HALPER, supra note 12, at 75-101 (discussing "China effect" in which
Beijing's aid policies and commercial practices "progressively undermine the ability of
American policy makers to shape the international agenda, as well as the faltering
efforts of Western financial institutions to demand better governance from the non-
Western world"); TAYLOR, supra note 170, at 165 ("[Tlhe explicitly hands-off
approach effectively privileges the principles (or lack thereof) of a host country's
elites, who determine where the receipts from increased oil revenues go."); Anabela
Lemos & Daniel Ribeiro, Taking Ownership or Just Changing Owners?, in AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 63, 64 (Firoze Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007)
[hereinafter AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES] ("China's weak social and environmental
requirements, disregard for human rights protections, lack of transparency and policy
of non-interference in internal affairs of the countries they lend to has resulted in
some African governments being shored up with funds while allowing them to avoid
local and international pressure to clean up corruption."); John Rocha, A New Frontier
in the Exploitation of Africa's Natural Resources: The Emergence of China, in AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 15, 16 ("[Blecause China does not insist on commitment to
democracy, good governance and respect for human rights as a precondition for
development assistance, Western pressure to that effect is diluted.").
233 See Deborah Brautigam, China's Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know, in
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Unfortunately, China is unlikely to abandon its approach quickly.
After all, it embraced the principle of non-interference, in part due to
concerns about foreign intervention in its own domestic matters.
B. Gradual Evolution
STAs evolve gradually. Although China's economy has been growing
at a breakneck pace, there are few dramatic internal reforms."' Indeed,
the development in the country, as fast as it has taken place, contrasts
significantly with the arguably failed "shock therapy" approach Russia
and other former Soviet republics took following the collapse of the
Soviet Union."' With a development strategy that deemphasizes
change in dramatic steps and a highly patient attitude toward
negotiation, China developed STAs in a way that added obligations
slowly in small increments. Instead of trying to make a great shock-
therapy leap, China takes the pragmatic path of "groping for stones to
cross the river" (mozhe shitou guohe) that Deng Xiaoping endorsed.236
CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra note 170, at 197, 213 ("[Tlhe lack of social and
environmental safeguards is beginning to create resistance among African civil society
groups.").
234 Accord Robert Devlin, China's Economic Rise, in CHINA's EXPANSION INTO THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 111, 129 ("The Chinese have been very
pragmatic in introducing policy reforms. Radical swings in policy are rare. Rather,
reforms tend to be introduced cautiously, gradually, and in an evolutionary way.").
235 As Joseph Fewsmith explains:
Chinese intellectuals who in the late 1980s had looked in envy upon
Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost, found themselves looking fondly upon
incremental reform as the Soviet Union broke apart, lost its superpower
status, and saw its economy and living standards decline. Whereas many
intellectuals believed that China in the late 1980s stood at the brink of
completing its process of 'crossing the river by feeling the stones,' even if
what lay on the other side was only vaguely defined, by the early 1990s they
had largely jettisoned their earlier romantic notions and come to accept the
fact that reform was a longer, more complicated process than they had ever
imagined. Incrementalism became the new mantra.
Joseph Fewsmith, The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Are There Limits?, in BALANCE
OF INFLUENCE, supra note 166, at 74, 77-78; see also OVERHOLT, supra note 205, at 114
("[Shock therapy imposed horrible traumas wherever it was tried, and its partial
implementation in Russia was responsible for turning the economy over to a dozen
billionaires and various groups of gangsters.").
236 JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004), available at
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf. Nevertheless, as William Overholt reminds us:
Chinese incrementalism did not mean slow reform .... One-sixth of the
world's people were restored to family farms from dismantled communes in
part of a decade. State enterprise employment declined by 60 million people
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Consider China's incremental approach in its development of the
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area ("ACFTA").m17 The development began
in November 2000 when Premier Zhu Rongji announced China's
intention to develop a free trade area that would foster greater
economic integration and closer regional cooperation in East and
Southeast Asia. In the ASEAN-China summit in Phnom Penh in
November 2002, China and members of ASEAN signed the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, 238
stating that a free trade area between China and ASEAN would be fully
implemented in 2010 for the original ASEAN-6 members (Brunei
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand), and by 2015 for its newest members (Vietnam, Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia).239 As the largest regional agreement in Asia
and the largest agreement among less-developed countries, ACFTA is
expected to cover "a market of 1.85 billion consumers and a combined
gross domestic product of almost US$2.5 trillion."240 The Agreement
was slightly revised through an amendment protocol adopted in Bali
less than a year later.241
In November 2004, China and ASEAN signed the Agreement on
Dispute Settlement Mechanism 24 2 as well as the Agreement on Trade in
Goods243 in Vientiane, Laos. They also agreed to implement an "Early
Harvest Program" to provide for the early opening of markets for
in a decade. Manufacturing employment declined by 25 million in a decade.
The top levels of government were cut by half in less than a decade.
Incrementalism meant that the leaders thought about each step and
generally field-tested each before acting, but they then acted very decisively.
OVERHOLT, supra note 205, at 114.
237 This incremental approach is attributed as much to the Chinese preference as it
is to the ASEAN way, which one commentator describes as "accommodating the
slowest ship in the convoy." BEESON, supra note 89, at 32.
238 ASEAN-China Framework Agreement, supra note 11.
239 Dorothy-Grace Guerrero, China's Rise and Increasing Role in Asia, in CHINA'S
NEW ROLE, supra note 8, at 191, 193.
240 Id.
241 Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Co-operation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People's
Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Oct. 6, 2003, available at http://www.aseansec.org/
15157.htm.
242 Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People's Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Nov. 29, 2004, available
at httpJ//www.aseansec.org/16635.htm.
243 ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade in Goods, supra note 11.
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specific goods and services.2" The Program "grant[ed] three-year
duty-free entry for ASEAN goods into the Chinese markets" and
subsequent tariff-free access of selected Chinese manufactured goods
to Southeast Asian markets.24 5 This arrangement provides a win-win
outcome for all the signatory parties: while China opens up its market
to ASEAN members and allows them to pool scarce resources and
aggregate markets,"' ACFTA secures China's access to the region's
raw materials while removing barriers to its exports.
In 2007, China and ASEAN signed an Agreement on Trade in
Services, covering such issues as tourism.2 48 They also adopted
244 As one commentator observes:
The modality on tariff reduction and elimination, including the EHP [Early
Harvest Program] especially, is thus far undoubtedly the jewel in the crown
of the ACFTA. The EHP has given ASEAN exporters significant advantage
over other WTO members in the trade of agricultural goods with China. In
the first half year after the EHP was implemented, ASEAN exports of fruits
and vegetables increased by 30 per cent. According to the statistics released
by the government of Malaysia, Malaysia's exports to China under the EHP
reached RM514 million and RM540 million in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
During the same period, it imported only RM14 million from China.
Wang, ASEAN-China FTA, supra note 107, at 198 (footnote omitted); see also Gao,
RTA Strategy, supra note 77, at 63 (footnote omitted) ("[Elven though many
commentators have doubted the economic benefit to China from an ASEAN-China
FTA, as the two are competitors on many products, China has adopted the guideline
of 'give a lot while demand little' in FTA negotiations because the political significance
of such an FTA greatly outweighs economic considerations.").
245 Guerrero, supra note 239, at 193. As Claude Barfield describes:
Under this provision, tariffs on a group of eight categories of agricultural
products (about 600 individual products) will be reduced ahead of schedule,
in most instances achieving zero tariffs by the end of 2006. This gave ASEAN
exporters of fruits and vegetables a strong leg up on other WTO Members,
and in 2004, after the reductions had been implemented, exports of these
products from ASEAN countries to China increased by 40%.
Claude Barfield, The Dragon Stirs: China's Trade Policy for Asia - And the World, 24
ARIZ.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 93, 114 (2007).
246 See John Wong & Sarah Chan, China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping
Future Economic Relations, 43 ASIAN SuRv. 507, 508 (2003) ("For ASEAN, an FTA with
China offers the Southeast Asian states a useful route to overcome the disadvantage of
smallness by pooling resources and combining markets. It is anticipated that with the
establishment of the China-ASEAN FTA, an economic region of 1.7 billion consumers
will enjoy a regional gross domestic product (GDP) of US$2 trillion, while total trade
is estimated to reach $1.23 trillion.").
247 See Guerrero, supra note 239, at 193.
24 ASEAN-China Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 11.
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memoranda of understanding on agricultural 249 and sanitary and
phytosanitary cooperation.o Most recently, in August 2009, China
and ASEAN signed the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement,2 1
completing the negotiation process as set forth in the Framework
Agreement.252 The two trading partners also signed memoranda of
understanding on cooperation in the fields of intellectual property and
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment.
While this incremental approach reflects the Chinese leadership's
preferred pace of reform (as well as ASEAN's preference for gradual
harmonization), it also promotes the focus on moderation and
flexibility in China's recent foreign policy. As Robert Sutter explains:
According to senior party strategists and other officials,
Chinese leaders reviewed the negative experiences of China's
past confrontations with neighbors and other powers, and the
negative experiences of earlier rising powers, such as Germany
and Japan in the twentieth century, to conclude that China
cannot reach its goals of economic modernization and
development through confrontation and conflict. As a result,
they incorporated the moderate features of China's recent
approach to Asia and the world into their boarder definition of
China's peaceful rise."
To some extent, the incremental approach China has taken reflects its
sensitivity to the peculiar needs of its Asian neighbors, in a large part
to avoid confrontation.
249 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic
of China on Agricultural Cooperation, ASEAN-China, Jan. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/19286.htm.
250 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Strengthening
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Cooperation, ASEAN-China, Nov. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/21089.pdf.
251 ASEAN-China Agreement on Investment, supra note 11.
252 Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN and China Ink Investment Agreement
(Aug. 15, 2009), available at http//www.aseansec.orgPR-ASEAN-China-Ink-Investment-
Agreement.
253 ASEAN Secretariat, Chairman's Statement of the 12th ASEAN-China Summit (Oct.
24, 2009), available at http://www.15thaseansummit-th.orgfPDF/24-13_7.2ASEAN-
ChinaChairman%27sStatement.pdf.
254 SUTTER, supra note 22, at 266.
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C. Flexibility
The terms in STAs tend to be flexible. Such flexibility is common in
the area of private law. To many Chinese, contracts - or, in this case,
international agreements - are the beginning of a working
relationship. 55 Rather than serving as a rigid, legalistic document that
parties rely on in courts, they memorialize the stages of negotiation
between the parties' 6 and lay down key principles that govern future
relationships.257 Borrowing from that negotiation mindset, it is
therefore no surprise that many of the terms in STAs are vague,
flexible, and laden with notions of friendship, cooperation, and
mutual recognition.5 Indeed, some Chinese commentators have used
the Early Harvest Programs and the phased-in tariff reductions to
illustrate China's flexible approach to STA negotiations."5
D. Not a Legal Transplant
Unlike FTAs or EPAs, STAs do not seek to transplant Chinese laws
onto the soil of other countries. In fact, China did not develop a
greater respect for the rule of law until recently." Although laws have
255 See HAROLD CHEE WITH CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOuT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 111
(2004) (noting that "in China, signing on the dotted line is only the beginning of your
real negotiations, not the end of it"); LUCIAN W. PYE, CHINESE NEGOTIATING STYLE:
COMMERCIAL APPROACHES AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLES, at xvi (1992) (" [T]he Chinese do
not treat the signing of a contract as signaling a completed agreement; rather, they
conceive of the relationship in longer and more continuous terms, and they will not
hesitate to suggest modifications immediately on the heels of an agreement.");
RICHARD H. SOLOMON, CHINESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: PURSUING INTERESTS THROUGH
"OLD FRIENDS" 183 (1999) ("For many Chinese businesspersons, a contract resembles
a prenuptial agreement. It defines who will get what if the marriage breaks down. It
should not attempt to regulate daily interaction within the marriage.").
256 See Kim Newby, Doing Business in China: How the State of 1.3 Million Can Tap
the Nation of 1.3 Billion, 19 ME. B. J. 238, 240-41 (2004).
257 See PYE, supra note 255, at 49-54 (discussing Chinese negotiating tactic of first
seeking agreement on general principles); SoLoMoN, supra note 255, at 71-75
(discussing Chinese negotiators' emphasis on principles).
258 See SoLoMoN, supra note 255, at 72 (noting distinction between "principles"
and "concrete arrangements").
259 See Glosny, supra note 187, at 158 (citing Li Qingsi who pointed out that Early
Harvest Programs provide "an example of China's flexible (linghuo) position in the
negotiations").
260 See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW
PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009) (discussing rule-of-law developments in
China); RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002)




been denounced during the Mao era, "[tioday, more and more things
are being done in the name of a rights discourse, as opposed to
political privileges, moral duties and class status."261 Notwithstanding
these recent developments, China has yet to see laws as a major export
like the United States.262 Thus, instead of transplanting laws abroad,
STAs seek to ensure that Chinese laws and the Chinese ways of life are
compatible with those found in the other signatory countries. Put
differently, STAs focus more on accommodation than conversion.
E. Not a Template
China is less interested in using STAs as a template for developing a
web of bilateral and regional treaties that will be later consolidated
into a more comprehensive multilateral agreement.6 In the
intellectual property area, there are significant variations among the
different STAs. The New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement
("NZCFTA") includes a lengthy chapter on intellectual property
protection. 2 64 By contrast, the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,
which was signed after the NZCFTA, does not mention intellectual
property protection at all. Likewise, although the Chile-China Free
Trade Agreement mentions the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement on Public Health 265 and identifies as an important goal the
prevention of abuse of intellectual property rights and restraints on
21
competition,266 the NZCFTA omits both issues.
To some extent, these variations and the accompanying flexibility
illustrate a key difference between STAs and the more template-
261 PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 6 (2d ed. 2003).
262 See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (offering critical examination of flaws in law
development movement); DAVID M. TRUBEK & ALVARO SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2007) (revisiting law and development debate); Jacques
deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and
Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179
(1999) (discussing American legal assistance to post-Communist societies); John V.
Orth, Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71, 82 (1998)
(discussing export of Rule of Law by Western Europe and Northern America); Peter
K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach About Intellectual Property
and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218, 241-48 (2003) (discussing United
States's export of its ideas and concepts).
263 See Yu, Six Secret Fears of ACTA, supra note 42 (manuscript at 68).
26 NZCFTA, supra note 15, arts. 159-66.
265 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
266 CCFTA, supra note 13, art. 111.
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oriented U.S. FTAs, which often include standardized terms to
maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the negotiations. As Peter
Drahos describes the United States's approach:
[Tihe BIT [bilateral investment treaty] which the United States
signed with Nicaragua in 1995 was based on the prototype
that the United States had developed for such treaties in 1994.
Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement . .. that the United States
has negotiated with Jordan will serve as a model for the other
FTAs being negotiated with Chile and Singapore.267
The United States uses FTA templates for at least three reasons.
First, the U.S. Trade Act of 2002, based on which these FTAs were
negotiated, calls on negotiators to develop provisions that "reflect a
standard of protection similar to that found in United States law." 6 "
Although FTA provisions are similar, they were not based on their
predecessors, but rather the ultimate template: U.S. laws. Second, such
an approach would encourage standardization of protections. In doing
so, FTAs would help foster an environment where countries can
consolidate negotiation gains through FTAs at the multilateral level.
Third, as Andrew Christie, Sophie Waller, and Kimberlee Weatherall
note in the intellectual property context:
[Aln FTA will have a more realistic chance of obtaining the
necessary approval if it follows an already established model.
This is because part of the Congressional approval process
involves the review of the text by certain Industry Advisory
Committees. At least in relation to IP, the relevant committee
has a history of drawing very explicit comparisons with prior
267 Drahos, BITs and BIPs, supra note 47, at 794; see also Susy Frankel, Challenging
TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 1023, 1025 (2009) ("The USA and the EU ... have 'template' intellectual property
chapters, which are 'non-negotiable' in exchange for other trade concessions.").
Likewise Andrew Guzman observes:
Although the U.S. treaty is, in principle, open to negotiation, BITs signed by
the United States are usually very similar to the model treaty. (In fact,
looking beyond United States treaties, BITs in place around the world are
quite similar to one another.) Although some negotiation is possible on
some issues, the United States is committed to the basic structure of the
model treaty and will only accept small changes. Typical provisions include
terms governing compensation for expropriation, the repatriation of profits,
dispute settlement procedures (usually through some neutral forum),
national treatment requirements, and "most favored nation" requirements.
Guzman, supra note 81, at 639.
268 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
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FTAs. Provisions that are seen to be less IP-protective than
provisions in past FTAs attract negative comment.269
The use of templates, therefore, has practical significance: it enhances
the possibility for congressional approval.
By contrast, STAs, with their different formats and coverage, seem to
be better tailored to the specific conditions of each signatory country.
Although these agreements sacrifice the benefits of efficiency and raise
negotiation and political costs, they benefit from the inherent features
of bilateral or plurilateral agreements. By directly addressing the
individual concerns and circumstances of each contracting party, the
agreements more successfully "take into consideration the particular
phases of development confronting each country, and provide for the
gradual inclusion of a developing country into the global economy. "270
If the underlying goals are both substantive and diplomatic, the
Chinese approach is likely to be more effective.
In sum, China and the United States have used very different
approaches to negotiate their bilateral and regional trade agreements.
Given the wide criticism of FTAs, it remains to be seen whether less-
developed countries will consider STAs more desirable. To its benefit,
China's less-developed country status suggests that "the means and
methods employed in Chinese operations . .. are more likely to
provide appropriate models and more instructive experiences in the
conditions of underdevelopment, lack of basic infrastructures and
other current technical incapacities."27 1 Many countries, businesses,
and nongovernmental organizations also consider China "as being
highly efficient in delivering rapid results through their projects . . .
and being prepared to go to geographical areas and sectors . . . where
most Western investors are not prepared to take business (or
personal) 'risks'. "272
In addition, as a victim of imperialism, China does not have the
same historical baggage as most Western countries. Its trading
partners, therefore, may see STAs as less threatening than FTAs or
EPAs. China's experience of humiliation and subjugation during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also makes the country closer
** Christie et al., supra note 49, at 220.
270 Giunta & Shang, supra note 46, at 329.
27 Dot Keet, South-South Strategic Bases for Africa to Engage China, in THE RISE OF
CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS
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to those less-developed trading partners who share similar
experiences.
Moreover, China's active engagement with the less-developed world
in the past decade successfully filled the "void left by an indifferent
Russia, a preoccupied United States, and a divided Europe."27 3 Indeed,
the Bush administration's undue obsession with terrorism and its
strong preference for unilateral measures have alienated many of its
past allies in the less-developed world." The United States's historical
tendency to dismiss attempts by East Asian countries to develop their
own institutions and cooperative measures275 and its refusal to provide
active assistance during the Asian financial crisis276  also make
partnerships with China very appealing.
This tendency, however, has slowly changed under the Obama
administration, which has shown greater interest in Asia than its
predecessor. For example, Secretary of the State Hillary Clinton chose
to visit Asia in her first trip abroad, marking the first time a U.S.
Secretary of State selected Asia, as opposed to Europe or the Middle
East, as the destination of the first overseas trip.277 In a speech in
Tokyo, President Obama also described the United States as an "Asia
Pacific nation."2 7 ' As he declared: "As a[n] Asia Pacific nation, the
United States expects to be involved in the discussions that shape the
future of this region, and to participate fully in appropriate
organizations as they are established and evolve."27 1
Notwithstanding the wide appeal of China in the region, many
Asian countries still consider China a potential security and economic
273 Eisenman, supra note 19, at 29.
274 See BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 134 (noting that,
since September 11, "the United States appeared to view regional affairs entirely
through the prism of the war on terrorism, while neglecting the [Asia] region's other
interests and challenges"); KURLANTZICK, supra note 193, at 186 ("Washington's near-
exclusive focus on terrorism in the years after September 11 only adds to alienation
overseas.").
275 See KANG, supra note 10, at 188 ("[The United States] has historically been
dismissive of East Asian regional attempts at creating multilateral institutions and
other forms of cooperation, believing that such efforts were both unlikely to succeed,
and absent American participation, unlikely to be effective.").
276 See KURLANTZICK, supra note 193, at 33-36.
277 See Peter K. Yu, Remember that China, U.S. Need Each Other, DES MOINES REG.,
Feb. 22, 2009, at 40P [hereinafter China, U.S. Need Each Other].






threat.280 Its rapid rise as an emerging economic superpower has
"ushered in a level of insecurity among [countries] unsure of China's
authoritarian system and future national intentions."28 1 China's low
production and labor costs have also contributed to "an influx of
cheap Chinese consumer goods, competition for export markets,....
growing trade deficitls]," and diversion of foreign direct
investments."
All of these, in turn, have raised concerns about whether China's
economic growth comes at the expense of its less wealthy and less
powerful neighbors. 8 1 "The influx of Chinese workers and
businessmen into Africa [for example, has presented] a potentially
serious social issue in the context of a continent ravaged by high levels
of unemployment."2 ' Likewise, "Malaysian and Indonesian workers
are . . . complaining about jobs being lost to Chinese workers because
of the closing of enterprises that are losing orders to China. "286
As a result, there is growing resentment of China in Africa, Latin
America, and Southeast Asia, where countries perceive Chinese
exports "as contrary to the interests of the local population."2 ' There
is also "rising anti-Chinese sentiment in some African countries,
where Chinese workers are perceived to be taking jobs away from
locals."2 88 As Chris Alden observes, this growing resentment is
280 See discussion supra note 182.
281 Campbell, supra note 184, at x.
282 Eisenman, supra note 19, at 42; accord ELLIS, supra note 156, at 1 (noting
"concern at increasing volumes of competitively priced Chinese goods, both
contraband and legitimate, that are beating out the goods of Latin American producers
in their own countries and displacing them in their traditional export markets");
Alden, China's New Engagement with Africa, supra note 25, at 226 (noting "concern
posed by the arrival of low-cost consumer goods (from China], which have enabled
Africans to purchase basic items formerly beyond their reach but that threaten local
manufacturing capacity"); see also TAYLOR, supra note 170, at 63-86 (discussing
impact of cheap Chinese goods in Africa).
2 See Glosny, supra note 187, at 159-60 (discussing ASEAN's concerns over
diversions of foreign direct investments).
' See id. at 154.
2 Corkin, supra note 170, at 147-48; see also Gregor Dobler, Solidarity,
Xenophobia and the Regulation of Chinese Businesses in Namibia, in CHINA RETURNS TO
AFRICA, supra note 179, at 237 (describing growing resentment of Chinese businesses
in Namibia); Robert I. Rotberg, Preface to CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra note 170, at vii,
viii ("[Als salutary as competition might be for Africa's continuing maturation,
importing Chinese labor to complete Chinese-organized infrastructural and mining
projects inhibits skill transfers and reduces indigenous employment growth.").
286 Guerrero, supra note 239, at 194.
2 Eisenman, supra note 19, at 43.
' Corkin, supra note 170, at 148.
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essentially "a contemporary version of the 'yellow peril' phobia . . .
[which is] based on a fear that Chinese numbers, industriousness and
ingenuity will swamp Africa."2 9
To make things worse, commentators have now begun to question
"whether the rapidly growing role of China ... is one of partnership
and cooperation, or more akin to colonial or neocolonial patterns, or
reflective of a new imperialism." 290 As Adebayo Adedeji, former head
of the Economic Commission for Africa, has noted with respect to
growing trade links between Africa and the emerging Asian
economies:
The traditional scenario that obtained in our trade with the
developed world, whereby our country supplies the former
with commodities and imports from there [sic] manufactured
products including capital goods, is being reproduced,
deliberately or not, in our intra-third world trade. I feel such a
situation is completely unacceptable to us. 291
Interestingly, less-developed countries had similar mixed reactions
toward China when the country was first reopened to Western trade.
As Harry Harding observed more than two decades ago:
On the one hand, China's size and resources, its skill at
international diplomacy, and its description of itself as a
developing country all give it substantial influence in Third
World capitals. On the other hand, China's emergence as a
major power is already breeding some apprehension,
particularly in the rest of Asia, about Beijing's longer-term
capabilities and intentions; and its growing involvement in
" Chris Alden, Africa Without Europeans, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA, supra note
179, at 349, 355.
290 Dot Keet, The Role and Impact of Chinese Economic Operations in Africa, in
CHINA'S NEw ROLE, supra note 8, at 78, 81; accord ELLIS, supra note 156, at 1 (noting
"concern about the long-term geopolitical ambitions of the PRC and worry about
exchanging one form of dependency for another"); TAYLOR, supra note 170, at 2 ("Our
African partners really have to watch out that they will not be facing a new process of
colonization [in their relations with China]." (quoting Karin Kortmann, Parliamentary
State Secretary, German Development Ministry)); Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi,
Introduction - Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Strategic and Development
Challenges, in RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA, supra note 271, at 1, 6 ("[Tihere is a
growing concern in Africa that the increasing engagement of the Asian giants, in their
search for energy and minerals, could, if not managed properly, turn out to be just as
bad as the 'scramble for resources' that led to the colonization of the continent during
the second half of the nineteenth century.").
291 Alden, Africa Without Europeans, supra note 289, at 354 (quoting Adebayo
Adedeji, former head of Economic Commission for Africa).
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international economic affairs may make it a competitor with
other developing countries for markets and capital.292
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that "Chinese-African relations were
established long before China's need for raw materials in the mid-
1990s.",293 Moreover, Africa's exports of raw material and imports of
finished products "characterize virtually all of Africa's bilateral trade
relations and, according to many influential analysts, have their roots
in the colonial period - when China was wholly absent from
Africa. "294
In addition, it is important not to overstate the coordination among
government agencies within China or presume a simple top-down
decision-making process involving top Chinese leadership.29 ' As Ian
Taylor reminds us:
In analyzing Sino-African relations and the policies that shape
and are shaped by them, we must always keep in mind that
there are many Chinas and equally, many Africas. Thus the
allegation, leveled by Western and African commentators
alike, that China is colonizing Africa is inherently misleading,
based on the assumption that Chinese foreign policy in Africa
follows an overarching grand strategy dictated by Beijing.
Rather, it is at best acceptable to state that Beijing's
policymakers have certain aspirations for specific facets of
Sino-African ties. The most obvious example concerns China's
state-owned oil corporations and their investments in African
resource industries, which are clearly connected to the energy
needs and domestic dynamics associated with China's rise. But
even here, rivalries among energy companies point to the fact
that the interests of one Chinese actor may not always
coincide with those of another, be it state or private.9
Moreover, many commentators note the hypocritical nature of the
criticisms from the Western world of China's dealings in Africa. 97
292 Harry Harding, Foreword to HARRIS, supra note 202, at v, ix.
293 Li Anshan, China's New Policy Toward Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra note
170, at 21, 37.
294 TAYLOR, supra note 170, at 177-78 (citations omitted).
295 See id. at 166 ("Sino-African relations are not part of a centrally directed and
controlled plan. In fact, according to one informant, the Ministry of Commerce is
often unaware of the presence, never mind the behavior, of various Chinese actors in
Africa.").
296 Id. at 161 (citation omitted).
297 See Africa and China: Then and Now, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 232, at
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They further point out the equally problematic dealings between
Western companies and those authoritarian regimes that are major
human rights violators."
IV. THREE FUTURE BATTLES
As this Article has shown, STAs are somewhat different from FTAs
or EPAs. If countries continue to rely on bilateral or regional
agreements to shape international norms, it will be interesting to see
what developments will take place in the near future. One may also
question whether the differences between STAs on the one hand and
FTAs and EPAs on the other would result in undesirable future
"battles" between these two different types of agreements. Although
such battles are possible, the different nature of these agreements
virtually guarantees that these two sets of agreements will not present
any direct conflicts. Instead, the proliferation of these agreements is
likely to precipitate indirect conflicts in three different areas.
A. Battle of Consensus
The first battle is a battle of consensus - a battle between the
Washington Consensus' and the emerging Beijing Consensus.300
57, 59 (Interview by Patrick Burnett with Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Dir., Ctr. for Advanced
Studies of African Soc'y) ("[lit is a bit hypocritical for Western states to be concerned
about how China is approaching Africa when they have had centuries of relations with
Africa, starting with slavery and continuing to the present day with exploitation and
cheating with subsidies which help the European Economic Community to ridiculous
extents so that a cow in the European community gets a subsidy of $2 a day and 60
per cent of Africa doesn't get that.").
298 See HALPER, supra note 12, at 76 ("Western countries do not have an
unblemished historical record, nor an admirable one today when it comes to doing
business with international human rights abusers and malcontents."); TAYLOR, supra
note 170, at 164 ("(Clondemning China's oil diplomacy while glossing over the
duplicity of Western governments and corporations toward Africa's energy industries
is somewhat unpalatable, smacking of a new, simplistic 'two-whateverism' (liangge
fanshi): whatever China does is wrong and whatever the West does is right."); Stephen
Brown, China's Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Clarifying Issues of Culpability, in
CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra note 170, at 250, 251 ("[T]he United States government and
U.S.-based oil companies are closely involved with the authoritarian regime of
Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang Nguema, among the worst violators of human
rights on the continent.").
.. John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for
International Economics, coined the term "Washington Consensus." John
Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in lATIN AMERICAN
ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1990). The
Washington Consensus was derived from recommendations in ten different areas: (1)
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While the Washington Consensus emphasizes free market reforms as a
path to economic prosperity, the Beijing Consensus suggests that
economic growth "comes from the state directing development to
some degree, avoiding the kind of chaos that comes from rapid
economic opening, and thus allowing a nation to build its economic
strength."30
Indeed, commentators have equated the battle between the two
consensuses as "a US-China ideological struggle, e.g., between a
'neoliberal Anglo-Saxon credo' and an Asian-derived 'socially oriented'
approach."" As Joshua Kurlantzick remarks, by emphasizing
economic development over political reform, the Chinese model
"stands in direct contrast to democratic liberalism, the economic and
political model emphasizing individual rights and civil liberties that
has underpinned the societies of the West, and of its democratic allies
in Asia. "303
fiscal deficits; (2) public expenditure priorities; (3) tax reform; (4) interest rates; (5)
the exchange rate; (6) trade policy; (7) foreign direct investment; (8) privatization; (9)
deregulation; and (10) property rights. Id.
300 Joshua Cooper Ramo, former foreign editor of Time, coined the term "Beijing
Consensus." RAMO, supra note 236, at 1. As he explains:
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the
place of a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms
about why the physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and
Brasilia. The first theorem repositions the value of innovation. Rather than
the "old-physics" argument that developing countries must start
development with trailing-edge technology (copper wires), it insists that on
the necessity of bleeding-edge innovation (fiber optic) to create change that
moves faster than the problems change creates. In physics terms, it is about
using innovation to reduce the friction-losses of reform.
The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to
control from the top you need a whole set of new tools. It looks beyond
measures like per-capita GDP and focuses instead of quality-of-life, the only
way to manage the massive contradictions of Chinese development. This
second theorem demands a development model where sustainability and
equality become first considerations, not luxuries. Because Chinese society is
an unstable stew of hope, ambition, fear, misinformation and politics only
this kind of chaos-theory can provide meaningful organization ....
Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one
that stresses using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be
tempted to tread on your toes.
Id. at 11-12.
301 KuRLANTZICK, supra note 193, at 56.
302 Sautman & Hairong, supra note 211, at 87, 101.
303 KURLANTZICK, supra note 193, at 56-57.
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Although the Washington Consensus has been around for close to
two decades, the Beijing Consensus has been particularly appealing to
countries with an authoritarian political system.3 4 It also attracts
rulers who favor the status quo, are strongly reluctant to introduce
power transition, or have genuine fears of a potential mess created by
such transition. According to Michael Glosny: "For economically
backward states with Communist or authoritarian political systems,
such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, China's
development path has become an object of study and emulation. 305
Likewise, Chris Alden writes: "The 'Beijing Consensus' challenges [the
formula dictated by the Washington Consensus] and may embolden
states, even those not recognized as pariahs, to opt out of the
complexities that these norms and values introduce to their economic
and political programmes. "306
Moreover, as Derek Mitchell explains: "China's promotion of
equality and democracy in international affairs, opposition to external
intervention in internal affairs, and support overall for the 'Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' provide a sense of kinship with
developing world leaders."3" Enshrined in the Bandung Conference of
3 See ALDEN, supra note 223, at 60 ("For 'pariah' regimes China is a welcome
source of stability, a new strategic partner and a provider of development assistance
and foreign investment."); Alden, China's New Engagement with Africa, supra note 25,
at 226 ("For leaders and regimes facing domestic instability, the stress of economic
restructuring and liberalization, or the pull of democratic transformation, China holds
up a beacon of hope that all the gains of office need not be lost in the process.");
Glosny, supra note 187, at 167 (noting that China's development path has become "an
object of study and emulation" for economically backward states with Communist or
authoritarian political systems).
30 Glosny, supra note 187, at 167; see also TAYLOR, supra note 170, at 23-27
(exploring whether China should serve as model for Africa); Ndubisi Obiorah et al.,
"Peaceful Rise" and Human Rights: China's Expanding Relations with Nigeria, in CHINA
INTO AFRICA, supra note 170, at 272, 289 (alterations in original) (quoting Ken
Nnamani, Nigerian Senate President) ("China [had] become ... a good model for
Nigeria in its quest for an authentic and stable development ideology.... China [was]
a lesson to Nigeria on the enormous good that a focused and patriotic leadership can
do to realise the dreams of prosperity and security for the citizens.").
306 Alden, Africa Without Europeans, supra note 289, at 355. Similarly, Joshua Ramo
observes:
China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying
to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit
into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly
independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with
a single massively powerful centre of gravity.
RAMO, supra note 236, at 3.
307 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 151, at 129.
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1954 that sought to promote Asia-Africa solidarity, the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence included "mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." 30
As China's soft power increases, its development model earns
greater admiration throughout the less-developed world. In recent
years, "Ig]overnment research teams from Iran to Egypt, Angola to
Zambia, Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to
Venezuela have been crawling around the Chinese cities and
countryside in search of lessons from Beijing's experience." 3 09
Likewise, African analysts point out that "China understands the
challenges of governing in areas where the bulk of the population lives
in abject poverty." 310
While the Chinese model may not promote democratic society and
civil liberties, it shows the Chinese leaders' pragmatic approach and
willingness to consider a wide variety of options.31  As Deborah
Brautigam reminds us:
At the end of the day, we should remember this: China's own
experiments have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out
of poverty, largely without foreign aid. They believe in
investment, trade, and technology as levers for development,
and they are applying these same tools in their African
engagement, not out of altruism but because of what they
learned at home. . . . These lessons emphasize not aid, but
experiments; not paternalism, but the "creative destruction" of
competition and the green shoots of new opportunities.312
Given China's success in pursuing these experiments and the hope it
offers to other countries, it is no wonder that Mark Leonard observes
308 Mitchell & McGiffert, supra note 202, at 14.
309 LEONARD, supra note 229, at 122; see also HALPER, supra note 12, at 31 (noting
"a growing number of developing nations that are loosely connected by an admiration
for China"); Stephen Marks, Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 232, at
11 (citing Nigerians' appreciation of Chinese model for providing stability and
visionary leadership).
310 BESADA, supra note 228, at 24.
311 See OVERHOLT, supra note 205, at 118 ("Chinese leaders ... do not accept
Western democratic ideology, but they accept individual practices, such as village
elections, because those practices have specific pragmatic value in reducing
corruption. They want to discover and test these things themselves, step by step,
rather than succumb to foreign ideological browbeating, but they are willing to
consider nearly everything." (emphasis added)).
312 DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON'S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA
311-12 (2010) (emphasis added).
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that "[flor the first time since the end of the Cold War, Europe and
America face a formidable alternative: the Chinese model."313
B. Battle of Influence
The second battle is a battle of influence; it concerns a country's
dominance in Asia, or the Asia-Pacific region. While it remains
speculative to discuss whether Asia would play a larger role in the
international policy debate, or whether there are any special "Asian
values" that this debate needs to take account of,314 it is clear that
there have been changing dynamics within Asia concerning how
international norms are being shaped. Indeed, as one commentator has
noted, ACFTA "will strengthen China's clout by making it the centre
of gravity in Asia and surpassing the influence of Japan and the US."315
Indeed, because Japan's position is closer to that of the European
Union and the United States, and because Japan has been a key player
in the trilateral trade negotiations (which was instrumental in
establishing the TRIPS Agreement and further plurilateral or
multilateral efforts in the intellectual property area), the development
of a unified Asian position down the road is rather unlikely. Instead,
any future Asian position will include conflict and compromise
between the ongoing developments in China (and other less-
developed Asian countries) and the more advanced system in Japan,
with perhaps doses of influence from the United States and the
European Union.
Since the explosion of the Chinese economy, commentators have
suggested a growing rivalry between China and Japan in Asia,316 which
313 LEONARD, supra note 229, at 134.
314 In the human rights area, "Asian values" were generally attributed to the Bangkok
Declaration, which Asian countries adopted at the Asian preparatory regional conference
before the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. Bangkok Declaration, in World
Conference on Human Rights, Regional Meeting for Asia, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1993, Report of
the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights '1 3-7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993), available at http:H/daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G93/125/95/PDF/G9312595.pdfOpenElement. Although the Declaration
did not articulate the oft-discussed "Asian values," it states explicitly that "while human
rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds." Id. 8. See generally sources cited in Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 UC DAvIS L. REv. 1039,
1142 n.380 (2007) (discussing Asian values and Bangkok Declaration).
3is Guerrero, supra note 239, at 193.
316 See generally BALANCE OF INFLUENCE, supra note 166 (providing timely
collection of essays on implications of China's rise for balance of influence in Asia);
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dates back to at least the nineteenth century. As the Chinese proverb
goes, one mountain cannot hide two tigers - or even three, if the
United States also counts as one. The disagreement between China
and Japan over the acceptable participants of the 2005 East Asian
Summit, for example, has foreshadowed a deepening conflict between
the two countries." Nevertheless, the ongoing push for initiatives
under ASEAN+3 and the China-Japan-South Korea free trade
agreement seem to suggest that "China understands that the future of
the region depends upon a constructive relationship between China
and Japan."3 " Thus far, both countries have also been rather reluctant
to "take the lead in regional integration (indeed, the main activities of
each seem to involve forestalling the other from assuming regional
",319leadership).""
In recent years, there has also been growing discussion about the
rivalry between China and the United States in Asia. However,
policymakers and commentators have largely overstated such rivalry.
Even if we ignore the regional nature of China's primary geopolitical
SUTTER, supra note 22, at 125-50 (discussing China's relations with Japan).
3 See Guerrero, supra note 239, at 192 ("The rift in the first [East Asian Summit]
was the tip of the iceberg that is the Sino-Japanese conflict.").
318 Zhang & Tang, supra note 9, at 48, 55.
3 William A. Callahan, Comparative Regionalism: The Logic of Governance in
Europe and Asia, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS 231, 242
(David Kerr & Liu Fei eds., 2007). As he explains further:
[B] oth Japan and China are 'reluctant powers' that are not willing to take the
lead in regional integration (indeed, the main activities of each seem to
involve forestalling the other from assuming regional leadership). This
reluctance stems from a regional environment that is characterized by fears
of Japan's past (militarism) and of China's future (hegemonism). The
Japanese empire regionalized East Asia during the first half of the twentieth
century, and Chinese and Korean memories of this period still stress the
violence of Japanese occupation and colonialism. Because of this suspicion
of its intentions, Japan repeatedly failed to shape an East Asian regionalism
in the 1960s and 1970s.
China has been unable to take the lead in forming regional institutions
because its East Asian neighbours worry about the character of Chinese
hegemony. Its recent rapid economic growth and military modernization
present a potential threat to regional order and stability. Moreover, there are
concerns that China's future leadership will follow the pattern of its imperial
past. Some fear that the PRC is modernizing the traditional Sinocentric
order, where the Middle Kingdom is surrounded by a periphery of tributary
states and barbarians, as a model for its new hegemonic politics.
Id. at 242-43 (footnote omitted).
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focus, 32 0 it remains unclear how Asian countries would respond to
China's rise as an emerging superpower. As David Shambaugh points
out:
[Hiaving to choose between Beijing and Washington as a
primary benefactor is the nightmare scenario for the vast
majority of Asian states.... It is not an exaggeration that all
Asian states seek to have sound, extensive, and cooperative
relations with both the United States and China, and thus will
do much to avoid being put into a bipolar dilemma.321
Moreover, economists and commentators have described "a chain-
gang relationship" between China and the United States in light of
their growing economic interdependence.32 2 Some also highlight the
G-2 (Group of Two) relationship between the two countries in
international matters that range from global economic recovery to
climate change.323 As a result, while there undoubtedly will be rivalry
between the two in the region, the form this rivalry will take is likely
to be complex.
Finally, the active developments in India, and the rapidly changing
dynamics in its economy and domestic industries,3 24 may also present
some interesting twists to the future Asian developments. As Robert
320 See ANDREW J. NATHAN & ROBERT S. Ross, THE GREAT WALL AND THE EMPTY
FORTRESS: CHINA'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY 15 (1997) (arguing that China is vulnerable
power whose most pressing security problems are powerful rivals at its own borders);
Gerald Segal, Does China Matter?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 24 (pointing out
exaggeration of China's importance in global economy and world politics).
321 David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia's New Dynamics, in
POWER SHIFT, supra note 9, at 1, 17; accord Frost, supra note 195, at 95, 105 (noting
that Asian countries "do not wish to be forced to choose between Beijing and
Washington").
32 Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global Economy, in
CHINA'S NEW ROLE, supra note 8, at 7, 11; see also HALPER, supra note 12, at 25 (" [T]he
American and Chinese economies are heavily interdependent. America has grown
addicted to Chinese credit; China has grown equally addicted to American
consumption. The depth of this interdependence creates a relationship that is
stabilized in a kind of economic version of mutually assured destruction."); Yu, China,
U.S. Need Each Other, supra note 277 (noting this "chain-gang relationship").
323 Compare BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 160, at 25 (noting need for China and
United States to "develop a very informal but increasingly effective 'G-2' . . . to help
guide the global governance process on an increasing number of economic topics"),
with HALPER, supra note 12, at 216-18 (arguing that U.S.-China relations to bilateral
status of special G2 relationship).
32 See, e.g., Dwijen Rangnekar, Context and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A
Comment on Amending India's Patent Act, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365, 379-80
(2007) (discussing changing dynamics of Indian pharmaceutical industry).
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Kagan puts it, "In Asia ... it is a three-way, not a two-way,
competition. India has not yet been able to compete effectively
against China, in part due to problems with its poor infrastructure,
bureaucratic red tape, and its failure to attract a substantial amount of
foreign direct investment.326 Nevertheless, India is catching up fast and
possesses strengths that China may not have - a younger workforce
with a good command of English, higher population growth, superior
capital efficiency, strong investment growth potential, and high
entrepreneurship.2  Some commentators even predict that India's
economy will eventually surpass China's.328 Some East Asian nations
also found including India in the East Asian Summit desirable and
believed such inclusion "might provide a 'hedge' against Chinese
dominance. "329
325 ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 41 (2009); see
also BEESON, supra note 89, at 88 ("[B]oth India and China have the potential to
redefine the balance of influence and power within any grouping of which they are a
part and the very definition of the region any new institution claims to represent.").
326 See Pete Engardio, Introduction to CHINDIA: How CHINA AND INDIA ARE
REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS 7 (Pete Engardio ed., 2006) [hereinafter CHINDIA]
(noting "India's decrepit infrastructure [and] bureaucratic red tape"); The Rise of India,
in CHINDIA, supra, at 45, 49 ("[Clompared to China with its modem infrastructure
and disciplined workforce, India is far behind in exports and as a magnet for foreign
investment.").
327 See Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, in CHINDIA, supra note 326,
at 27 (discussing India's strengths vis-a-vis China); The Rise of India, supra note 326, at
50 (noting "deep source of low-cost, high-IQ, English-speaking brainpower [that] may
soon have a more far-reaching impact on the U.S. than China"). As one commentator
observes interestingly:
Chinese analysts argue that because India's salaries are lower, costs are
cheaper, thereby making Indian products more competitive. Language is also
a factor. Chinese businessmen fear that U.S. businesses will prefer Indian
products because of the Indian facility with English. In a strange turn of
events, the Chinese population is now asking whether their market is likely
to be flooded with cheap Indian goods.
Lal, supra note 21, at 133, 141.
328 See, e.g., OVERHOLT, supra note 205, at 193 ("[T]he second half of the [twenty-
first] century could be India's . . . if it engages in transformative efforts to improve its
education and infrastructure."); The Rise of Chindia, in CHINDIA, supra note 326, at
13, 14 ("Until now, China has attained dramatically higher growth. But some experts
believe India's superior capital efficiency, higher population growth, and younger
workforce mean growth is more sustainable and will enable India to surpass China in
economic growth in the coming decades."); Why India May Be Destined to Overtake
China, in CHINDIA, supra note 326, at 27 (discussing different factors that may enable
India to surpass China).
329 BEESON, supra note 89, at 88.
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C. Battle of Isms
The final battle is a battle of isms - a battle between bilateralism
and plurilateralism on the one hand and multilateralism on the other.
As I have noted in previous works, bilateralism is one of the five
disharmonizing trends in the international intellectual property arena
and the larger international trading system.330 It resonates well with
China's traditional approach for diplomacy and its historical mistrust
of multilateral institutions. As David Kang recounts: "In the mid-
1980s, analyses of Chinese foreign policy emphasized China's
preference for bilateral relations and its disdain for multilateral or
cooperative institutions." 3 3 Lawrence Freedman also observes that,
"until comparatively recently [China] has shown disinterest and often
distrust in international treaties and the principles of multilateralism,
fearing them as means by which it could be put on the spot.""33
Since the mid-1990s, China's foreign policy has been changing. 333
With growing power, the country has now developed a growing
interest in participating in multilateral organizations and may be on its
way to become what former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick
described as a "responsible stakeholder" 33  or what some Chinese
leaders and academics describe as a "responsible great power" (fuzeren
de daguo). * In fact, with growing confidence in its ability to shape the
regional environment, China has now become "more active on the
global stage, including in multilateral institutions and the security
arena."33 6
To date, some commentators have even argued that multilateral
organizations may greatly benefit China in its disputes with the
330 See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 375-408; Peter K. Yu, Five
Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in 4
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra note 175, at 73, 84-88.
331 KANG, supra note 10, at 88.
332 Lawrence Freedman, China as Global Strategic Actor, in DOES CHINA MATTER?,
supra note 209, at 21, 22.
3 See generally AvERY GOLDSTEIN, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: CHINA'S GRAND
STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2005) (providing recent discussion of China's
foreign policy); NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY (Robert S.
Ross & Alastair lain Johnston eds., 2006) (same); ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINESE FOREIGN
RELATIONS: POWER AND POLICY SINCE THE COLD WAR (2d ed. 2010) (same).
13 Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy U.S. Sec'y of State, Whither China: From
Membership to Responsibility?, Address to the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.ncuscr.org/
files/2005GalaRobertZoellickWhitherChinal.pdf.
13 Zhang & Tang, supra note 9, at 48, 49.
336 Id. at 54.
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European Union or the United States. With the support of less-
developed countries in the international community, China is likely to
prevail in numbers in those international fora where the vote of each
country counts. Moreover, as these commentators have noted, China
may be able to "use international law as a weapon."3 7 Because
international law and multilateral rules serve as political constraints in
democracies, they believe "China could turn the United Nations and
regional organizations into an amplifier of the Chinese world-view -
discouraging the USA from using its might in campaigns like the Iraq
War." 338
It remains interesting to see whether STAs would eventually create a
network of trade agreements that may be further consolidated into a
single multilateral arrangement. Although commentators have
questioned China's intention to achieve such an arrangement, 339 the
development of bilateral and regional trade agreements would no
doubt promote multilateralism by facilitating the development of
common policy positions among participating states.3
If STAs eventually are consolidated into a multilateral arrangement,
China's influence through STAs is likely to be even more significant.
Such influence may justify the existing concerns of the European
Union and the United States over China's different approaches and
emphases. While STAs are unlikely to replace FTAs or EPAs as the
main driver of future multilateral treaties, they may become equally
influential. As Mark Leonard surmises: "If China continues to grow, it
is possible to imagine that in the future, demonstrators outside the
World Trade Organization will complain about the Beijing Consensus
as well as the Washington Consensus."34
CONCLUSION
Although there has been a growing use of bilateral and regional
trade agreements, the STAs China signed are very different from the
EPAs or the FTAs that the European Union and the United States
established. While STAs do not seek to export Chinese laws to the
signatory countries, China developed the agreements with specific
33 LEONARD, supra note 229, at 107.
338 Id. at 108.
33 See, e.g., Jiang, supra note 218, at 12 ("China does not aim to forge its bilateral
FTAs together to form multilateral arrangements.").
340 See Cho, supra note 38, at 238 (noting that "regionalism may contribute to
multilateralism").
3 LEONARD, supra note 229, at 133 (emphasis added).
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objectives and its self-interests in mind. Because China's national
interests may be redefined in the near future, its objectives and the
accompanying STA strategies may change accordingly. As Kurt
Campbell reminds us: "China's strategy toward the developing world
remains largely a work in progress. Tensions between different
priorities are already apparent, and these are likely to grow more
discordant over time."342 Similarly, Eric Heginbotham observes that
China's "desire to be recognized as a constructive member of
international society bumps up against resource diplomacy that
supports autocratic and abusive governments in several corners of the
world."343
Together with the complex economic conditions and uneven
development, China's changing goals, interests, and priorities and the
potential conflicts STAs will create are likely to provide interesting
developments that will affect not only Asia but also the entire
international community. As STAs become more complex and
influential, they have also become a subject that is worthy of greater
attention from both academic researchers and policymakers. This
Article, hopefully, provides the needed spark for more active research
in the area.
342 Campbell, supra note 184, at xi; see also Peter Van Ness, China and the Third
World: Patterns of Engagement and Indifference, in CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY FACES THE NEw MILLENNIUM 151, 164 (Samuel S. Kim ed., 4th ed.
1998) ("PRC policy toward the Third World is always subject to change, even making
180-degree changes, when Beijing decides to take a different approach to achieving
wealth and power in its relations with the most influential states in the system.").
4 Heginbotham, supra note 34, at 190.
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